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I. INTRODUCTION
The nation's collective attention was riveted by the issue of diversity in higher education in April and June of 2003 as the Supreme Court
considered arguments and released its rulings in the University of
Michigan affirmative action cases.1 Like those cases, contemporary discourse regarding diversity in higher education has focused almost exclusively on the composition of the student body and, to a lesser extent, the
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1. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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faculty.2 Diversity advocates measure success or failure largely by the
racial, ethnic, religious, cultural, and gender heterogeneity on individual
campuses. This approach focuses on intra-institutional diversity.
A different measure of diversity in higher education is also worthy
of attention and study: inter-institutional diversity. This measure of diversity focuses on the variety in size, mission, perspective, and educational or pedagogical approach among the whole universe of institutions
of higher education. Inter-institutional diversity in higher education encourages experimentation in pedagogical approaches, as well as the cultivation of specializations and focused inquiry. From agricultural and
technical colleges to small liberal arts schools and large research universities, each approach provides a unique piece of the mosaic of higher
education. Such inter-institutional diversity in American higher education is worthy of protection and perpetuation, just as intra-institutional
diversity is a valid educational goal. 3
Religiously-affiliated institutions of higher education make up a
small but significant number of post-secondary educational institutions
in the United States; thus, adding to that inter-institutional diversity. 4
Although the number has been declining since the midpoint of the twentieth century, approximately one-third of four-year degree-granting institutions have some sort of current, conscious religious connection or affiliation.5 The degree of connection and the formality of the affiliation to
a religion or a religious organization can vary drastically from institution

2. This article is not meant in any way to criticize the focus on student body diversity. Instead, this article chooses an alternate "lens" through which to view diversity in higher education
and suggests that it is, as well, a worthwhile measure of diversity.
3. See Colloquy Live: Faith Statements at Religious Colleges, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC. (Online Edition) (May 23, 2002), at http://chronicle.com/colloquylive/2002/05/religious
("One of the characteristics of American higher educ[ation] is that it is made up of many diverse
colleges and universities with diverse perspectives and missions. This provides a very strong mosaic
of diverse colleges and universities with great strength to the entire higher education system.")
(quoting Anthony Diekema).
4. See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM
PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 439 (1994). See also ARTHUR F.
HOLMES, THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN COLLEGE 7-9 (Rev. ed. 1987) (describing the educational and

religious "distinctives" of the Christian college); Eugene H. Bramhall & Ronald Z. Ahrens, Academic Freedom and the Status of the Religiously Affiliated University, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 227, 250
(2001) ("The very existence of religiously affiliated universities offers diversity to both the academy
and society in general.").
5. See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitution and the Religious University, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
479, 480 (1998) (citing "most estimates" numbering religious institutions at 800). See also Ralph D.
Mawdsley, God and the State: Freedom of Religious Universities to Hire and Fire, 36 EDUC. L.
RE'. 1093, 1094 (1987) (indicating that, of four year universities, slightly more than one third are
religiously affiliated).
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to institution. 6 Nevertheless, religiously affiliated post-secondary educa-

tion has had, and continues to have, a marked influence on American
cultural and intellectual life.
Religious colleges and universities have made significant contributions to the history and progress of the nation. "[T]hey enrich our intellectual life by contributing to the diversity of thought and preserving important alternatives to post-Enlightenment secular orthodoxy."' In postmodem civil society, the injection of religion in the marketplace of ideas
is generally discouraged and often treated with outright hostility. 8 Religious institutions of higher education provide an outlet for a process of
seeking truth that is an alternative, or supplement, to the dominant "scientific method" approach.9 They allow serious religious scholarship to
continue when it might otherwise be shut out of the modem secular
academy. 0 Many such institutions provide a safe haven for religious
scholars in secular subjects from which to dissent from the majoritarian
academic culture and to offer an alternative to the pervasively secular
viewpoints emanating from most non-religious institutions. 1 The unique
approach of many religiously-affiliated institutions - including studying
subjects that are not strictly religious through a lens tinted by a religious
worldview - produces a population of graduates who are equipped to
add to the intellectual diversity of the general working populace and, potentially, to utilize that unique viewpoint in both their public and private
pursuits." Additionally, such institutions are integral to the religious life
6. See ROBERT T. SANDIN, AUTONOMY & FAITH: RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT
DECISIONS IN RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED HIGHER EDUCATION 24-35 (1990) for a survey of selfproclaimed religiously affiliated institutions of higher education that highlighted these differences.
The institutions range from those that are "pervasively religious" to "independent institutions with
historic religious ties."
7. Michael W. McConnell, Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges and Universities, 53
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 312 (1990).
8. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993)

(criticizing the exclusion of religious

thought from the public sphere, and suggesting that religion has a valid and important place in the
marketplace of ideas).
9. See Bramhall & Ahrens, supra note 4, at 250.
10. See ANTHONY J. DIEKEMA, ACADEMIC FREEDOM & CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP 16 (2000)
(highlighting several anecdotal examples of anti-religion bias in academia).
II. See McConnell, supra note 7, at 315. See also Bramhall & Ahrens, supra note 4, at 25051 (citing a study at Brigham Young University in which 88% of the faculty confirmed a belief that
they had greater academic freedom at a religious university rather than less); Carter, supra note 5, at
484 ("The religious university, like any other religious institution, can serve [an] important societal
function of resistance: of standing up for the possibility that life itself has different meanings than
those the dominant culture tries to create.").
12. See Bramhall & Ahrens, supra note 4, at 251. Similarly, Justice O'Connor noted in her
majority opinion in Grutter that American businesses value the benefits their workers derive from
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and constitutionally protected religious liberty 13 of many citizens; therefore, such institutions are worthy of preservation.
Indeed, "preservation" has immediate significance for religiouslyaffiliated institutions of higher education. They often face great pressure
to conform to secular norms and thus must take proactive steps to stay
true to their missions, which are informed and motivated to a great extent by their religious character. 14 Determining what steps are appropriate and acceptable to maintain that religious mission and character, and
yet to stay true to the hallmark of open inquiry and academic freedom
that is essential to any institution of higher learning, is a difficult task.
In any academic setting, choosing who will teach is an important
and often controversial task. Justice Frankfurter identified the responsibility-or rather the right-to -make that choice as one of the four essen:
tial freedoms associated with higher learning. 15 The role of the professor,
especially with regard to the instruction of undergraduate students, has
come under increased scrutiny. 16 In the face of this heightened criticism,
the choice of who will teach, be promoted, and receive tenure becomes
all the more weighty.
At religious institutions of higher education, the choice of who is
invited to serve as a professor or staff member includes the same important considerations confronting secular institutions.17 In addition, their
religious nature adds another layer of complexity to the decision. These
religious institutions not only must consider an applicant's or emattending schools with diverse student bodies. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308. "[M]ajor American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be
developed through exposure to'widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." Id. If true,
then institutions that preserve and promote ideas and viewpoints that add to the diversity of thought
are likewise beneficial. Religious institutions of higher education do just that.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.See Bramhall & Ahrens, supranote 4, at 251; Carter, supra note 5,
at 480.
14. See Bramhall & Ahrens, supra note 4, at 253.
15. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12, a statement of a conference of senior scholars
from the University of Capetown and the University of Witwatersrand). The other three essential
freedoms Justice Frankfurter identified were "what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study." Id.
16. See, e.g., John Yemma, Report Faults Research Colleges for Neglecting Students,
BOSTON GLOBE, April 21, 1998, at A3 (discussing a report by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching urging research institutions in the United States to emphasize teaching
among their faculties and give students greater access to full-time faculty); see generally CHARLES
J. SYKES, PROF SCAM: PROFESSORS AND THE DEMISE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1988) (discussing
notorious lack of presence on campuses by professors and complacency problems created by tenure).
17. See EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR. & PHILIP R. MOOTS, GOVERNMENT AND CAMPUS:
FEDERAL REGULATION OF RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED HIGHER EDUCATION 34 (1982).
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ployee's qualifications for a position or promotion, but they must also
determine what role personnel decisions play in the continuing livelihood of the institution's mission.1 8 Due to these dual needs, many such
institutions utilize some sort of preferential employment scheme based
on religious criteria to protect and to perpetuate their religious missions
20
and environments.' 9 Thereby, these institutions maintain a critical mass
of faculty and staff who are sympathetic to or even revel in the religious
atmosphere.
Though utilizing some kind of religious test for employment decisions comports with the ideal of religious liberty and preservation of institutional diversity in higher education, it runs counter to our commitment to the eradication of discrimination in all forms. There is clearly a
fundamental tension here. Congress has declared discrimination in employment on the basis of religion to be unlawful; 2' however, Congress
also specifically exempted certain religious organizations, including
some religious educational institutions.2 2 These exemptions reflect Congress's respect for constitutionally-protected religious liberty.
This article does not contend, nor to the author's knowledge does
anyone contend, that these exemptions were developed solely to preserve
institutional diversity in higher education. Congress was concerned,
however, that the religious nature of such organizations would be diluted
if they were compelled to hire people of different religious beliefs or no
belief at all.23 Given the desirability of maintaining religious institutions
of higher education and those institutions' perceived need to use reli18. See generally Robert J. Araujo, 'The Harvest is PlentifulBut the Workers are Few': Hiring Practicesand Religiously Affiliated Universities, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 713 (1996) (positing that
religious institutions of higher learning must consider the religion's broader missions in hiring practices).
19. In 1978, a survey of religious institutions of higher education revealed that most of the
sample reported using a religious preference for certain positions and almost half of the sample reported using a religious preference for all faculty positions. See GAFFNEY & MOOTS, supra note 17,
at 34.
A more recent survey found that over seventy percent of religious institutions of higher education
utilize some form of religious test when hiring the president of the institution, nearly half employ a
religious preference for full-time and tenured faculty, and one-quarter do so with regard to all staff.
SANDIN, supra note 6, at 40.

20. The term "critical mass" assumed significance in the Grutter affirmative action case. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316, 318-20, 330, 333-36. The term is used here with the same general meaning: that a critical mass of certain classes of persons is necessary to offer the benefits of a diverse
student body. To implement their missions, religious institutions of higher education require a critical mass of individuals who share or support their particular religious beliefs.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l(a)-2(e)(2) (2000).
23. See infra Part II.A.
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gious preferences in employment to maintain their missions, this article
explores whether such institutions should use the exemptions provided
by Congress as a tool - blunt as it may be - to maintain their religious
character.
In Part I, two important questions are addressed: first, whether and
to what extent religious institutions of higher education may discriminate
when making decisions regarding hiring, promoting, and terminating
administration, faculty, and staff, and, second, even if they may, whether
they should use that ability as a way to preserve the institutional variety
religious institutions provide to post-secondary education.
Part II of the article outlines the exceptions relevant to religious institutions of higher education provided in Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and its amendments (Title VII).24 It propounds an explanation
of the original purpose of the exemptions, examines the scope of the exemptions as that scope has been clarified by the courts, and suggests a
broad interpretation of the scope where it remains unclear. Part III outlines the constitutionally-compelled exemption to Title VII (and other
federal and state law claims) known as the ministerial exception.
In Part IV, the article shifts focus from the legal entitlement of religious institutions of higher education to discriminate when making employment decisions (the "may" inquiry), to the two most important institutional concerns facing religious institutions of higher education (the
"should" inquiry). These two, often-conflicting, concerns are the secularization trend among religious institutions of higher education and the
value and tradition of academic freedom. Each must be considered before these institutions address whether discriminatory preferencing is a
necessary or desirable tool to preserve their religious missions. Finally,
in Part V, the article concludes that simply because religious institutions
of higher education may, in many instances, legally discriminate in employment does not necessarily mean that they should. While such institutions rightfully may discriminate in numerous instances, the article ends
with a cautionary note against the practice of discrimination in all but
those instances where it is critical to preserve the institution's religious
character.

24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
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II. STATUTORY COVERAGE
Title V11 25 is the major statutory mechanism through which the federal government combats employment discrimination.2 6 Section 703(a)
of Title VII prohibits an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."2 7 An "employer" is defined in the statute as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
,,28 All but the smallest of
in the current or preceding calendar year.
institutions of higher education fall within the regulatory ambit of Title
VII. Therefore, nearly all religious institutions of higher education are
bound by the dictates of Title VII in all of their employment decisions, to
the extent that such coverage is constitutional. There are, however, exemptions that sometimes allow a religious institution of higher education
prohibited by Title
to make decisions on bases or for reasons otherwise
29
VII when they hire, promote, and fire employees.
A. Exemptions Specific to Religious EducationalInstitutions:
Sections 702(a) and 703(e)(2)
In drafting Title VII, legislators considered the important interplay
between the new responsibilities and constraints being placed on employers covered by the Act and the important liberties that might be intruded upon by applying those responsibilities and constraints to certain

25. Id.
26. While state statutes also regulate employment discrimination and are therefore relevant,
the coverage of those statutes is beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, many state statutes
simply mirror the provisions of Title VII and would add little to this discussion.
Other federal civil rights statutes also prohibit discrimination in employment on other grounds. See,
e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000) (prohibiting wage discrimination based on
gender); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of age involving employees over 40 years of age); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability, record of disability, or perceived disability). Courts routinely interpret these statutes and
their respective enforcement schemes consistently with Title VII. Where appropriate, the article
notes instances that these statutes are also relevant, most notably in the discussion of the ministerial
exception. See infra
Part lII.A.
27, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000),
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
29. See infra Part II.A.
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types of employers.3 ° Specifically, Congress was concerned with the
right of a religious organization to identify, in employees, the characteristics necessary to carry out the organization's mission. 3' They were
spurred, not in small part, by concerns about how Title VII's demands on
employer conduct squared with the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 32 Along with churches and religious orders, religious educational
institutions garnered attention.
The proponents of the statutory exemptions argued that religious
organizations would face a dire struggle to maintain their religious leadership and character without exemption from Title VII's prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of religion.3 3 Representative Poage, a
Texas Democrat, forcefully stated this concern during the 1964 floor debate in the House of Representatives. He argued that religious schools
provide "a religious atmosphere in which they may help develop a better
citizenship, and that religious atmosphere certainly cannot be maintained
if these schools are required by some agency in Washington to employ
any atheist that comes along and asks for employment when they have a
vacancy. 34 Inspired by this and similar concerns, Congress carved out
two limited exemptions
for certain religious organizations: sections
36
702(a) 35 and 703(e)(2).
The two exemptions, though somewhat different in their precise
wording, are remarkably similar in effect. Section 702(a) appears
broader in application than at first blush. It provides that Title VII "shall
not apply ...to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities."37 Thus, the section applies to religious organizations, including religious institutions of higher education that qualify as "religious educa-

30. See, e.g., Araujo, supra note 18, at 755-68 (presenting an in-depth discussion of the legislative debate regarding section 703(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2000)).
31. See id.
32. See infra Part III for a related discussion of these constitutional concerns and Title VII's
coverage.
33. See 110 CONG. REC. 2588 (1964).
34. Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a). Throughout this article, this section of Title VII is referred to as
either "section 702(a)" or "the religious organization exemption."
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2). Throughout this article, this section of Title VII is referred to
as either "section 703(e)(2)" or "the religious education exemption." A subpart of this exemption is
referred to as "the curriculum exemption." See infra Part ll.A.2.b.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000).
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tional institutions" under the act. In contrast the language of section
703(e)(2) is limited specifically to the education sector. It provides that:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college,
university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to
hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or
managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution38of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
Thus, the exemption applies to either of two kinds of religious institutions of higher education: those owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a religious organization or those whose curriculum propagates a
particular religion.
There is substantial overlap between the two provisions. In fact, one
influential commentator contends that "[t]he proviso [of section
703(e)(2)] is largely subsumed by the broader exemption found in section 702[(a)]. ' '39 This claim somewhat overstates the redundancy. The
overlap is less than total and the slightly different wording in the two
provisions suggests some important differences. 40 Therefore, the remainder of this section describes the reach of the two exemptions and probes
the ambiguities in the legislative language of each.
1. WHY DO SECTIONS 702(a) AND 703(e)(2) OVERLAP?
As originally enacted, the religious organization exemption covered
fewer employment positions than it does today. The section as enacted in
1964 allowed religious employers to discriminate on the basis of religion
In a series
only with regard to the organization's "religious activities.
1972,
Congress
revisited
section
of amendments to Title VII passed in

38.
39.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2000).
MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.13 n.30 (Practitioner's ed.

1988).
40. In addition, judges avoid construing statutory language in a way that renders it duplicative. See, e.g., NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 609 (1998) ("Statutory interpretations that render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment are strongly disfavored.") (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). This is further evidence that relying on such a reading is likely unwarranted.
41.

H.R. CONF. REP. No. 92-899, at 16 (1972).
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702(a),42 removed the modifier "religious," and essentially included all
activities of a religious organization under the exemption. 43 The broadening of the exemption spawned serious debate about its constitutionality. The section's effect before the modification simply was thought to
be reflective of the First Amendment's demands regarding freedom of
religion. The amended section, allowing religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion in all of their activities, drew criticism
as a violation of the Establishment Clause.44 Far from protecting freedom
of religion, critics contended, it improperly benefited4 religious employers, burdening nonreligious employers in comparison. 1
The Supreme Court addressed the question of section 702(a)'s constitutionality in 1987. A unanimous court declared in Corporationof the
PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos 4 6 that section 702(a) does not violate the Establishment Clause and
is a permissible accommodation of religion - though perhaps not compelled by the Free Exercise Clause. 47 Working through the three-part
Lemon v. Kurzman48 Establishment Clause test, the majority found that
the Deseret Gymnasium, a nonprofit and nonreligious arm of the Mormon Church, could fire a janitor for failure to maintain a certificate of
good standing with the church.49 Several justices qualified their concurrences with the judgment of the majority and filed separate opinions.5 °
Nevertheless, the several opinions share the common understanding that
section 702(a)'s exemption is for the most part safe from constitutional
42. Originally, section 702 had no subsections denoted by letter. An amendment necessitated
the lettered subsections. For the sake of consistency, clarity, and timeliness, this article refers to the
provision as section 702(a), even when the reference is technically an anachronism.
43. H.R. CONF. REP.No. 92-899, at 16.
44. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (rejecting plaintiff's claim which relied on this argument).
45. Seeidat 333.
46. Id. at 339.
47. Id. at 334.
48. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See infra note 249 for an explanation of this three-part test.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Amos, disagreed with the majority's use of the
Lemon test and argued that an endorsement test should be used to determine the validity of the section under the Establishment Clause. She agreed, nonetheless, under the endorsement analysis that
section 702 was constitutional as applied in that case. Amos, 483 U.S. at 348-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See infra notes 245-255 and accompanying text for a discussion of how recent distrust of the Lemon
test and the introduction of the endorsement inquiry could make a difference in the outcome of another exemption from Title VII for religious institutions of higher education.
49. Amos, 483 U.S. at 330, 339.
50. Notable among the qualifications found in the concurrences is the contention that the case
leaves open the question of the constitutionality of section 702(a) as applied to for-profit activities
of religious organizations. Id. at 344, 346, 349 (Brennan, Blackmun, and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
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challenge and abrogation. 51 Therefore, religious institutions of higher
education that qualify for the religious organization exemption need not
distinguish between their "religious" and "secular" activities when invoking the exemption.
Section 703(e)(2), on the other hand, has not been significantly revised since it was included in the original Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Never challenged on constitutional grounds, it makes no mention of "religious activities," or of activities at all. It simply covers all employees in
religious education.
Why, then, is there overlap between the two sections? What was the
perceived need to include religious educational institutions in section
702(a)? The overlap might be explained by a drafting oversight that occurred in conjunction with another amendment to section 702(a) in 1972.
Originally, not only was section 702(a) restricted to the religious activities of religious organizations, it also exempted all educational institu52
tions from its coverage for positions related to educational activities.
Presumably, legislators originally included section 703(e)(2) to expand
the educational exemption for certain religious educational institutions 5to3
cover all employees, not just those involved in educational activities.
When Congress eliminated the general educational institution exemption
in response to widespread discrimination in higher education,54 religious
educational institutions were added to the section 702(a) list of religious
organizations covered by the exemption.55 Therefore, the overlap could
be explained by Congress's intent that the amendments in 1972, especially the elimination of the general educational employer exemption,
51. This is clearly true with regard to all activities except perhaps those secular, for-profit activities of an otherwise qualified organization. For an argument that section 702(a) should apply to
all activities of nonprofit religious organizations and only the religious activities of for-profit religious organizations, see Scott D. McClure, Note, Religious Preferences in Employment Decisions:
How FarMay Religious Organization Go?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 587, 604-06 (1990).
52. As originally enacted, the section exempted "an educational institution with respect to the
employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such
institution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970).
53. A statement by Representative Gathings during congressional debate over section
703(e)(2) supports this presumption. He stated that religious schools should be free to restrict employment of "any employees" by looking to religious criteria without EEOC review or challenge.
110 CONG. REc. 2586 (1964). An isolated comment by a single representative is not binding; however, when that comment offers a reasonable explanation for a seemingly unreasonable redundancy
in statutory language, it should not be ignored.
54. See TERRY L. LEAP, TENURE, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE COURTS 24-25 (2d ed. 1995)
(discussing the House of Representatives report that accompanied the amendment that eliminated
the higher education exemption and its particular attention on the abundance of discrimination
against women in higher education).
55. See S. REP. No. 92-415, at 35 (1971); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 92-899, at 16 (1972).
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not be read to change the protection that had always been provided to religious educational institutions in section 703(e)(2). In essence, 702(a)
could be read as an emphasis of the exemption in 703(e)(2). 6
Another explanation for the perceived overlap between the two sections relies on a difference in their general effect and placement. Section
702(a) purports to exempt qualified employers from application of the
entire subchapter.5 7 On the other hand, section 703(e)(2) excuses employers from what might otherwise be an unlawful employment practice. 58 Generally, section 703 is about unlawful employment practices,
describing them with reference to proscribed employer, employment
agency, and labor organization practices.5 9 Therefore, one could read
section 703(e)(2) as an exemption from section 703 only. Such a reading
might mean, in practical effect, that a religious institution of higher education that qualifies under section 702(a) would be exempted from Title
VII completely. In contrast, an institution that qualified under section
703(e)(2) would only be exempted from section 703. Under this reading,
the most notable difference between these two types of institutions
would be that the institution qualifying for the section 702(a) exemption
would be excused from EEOC reporting requirements, while the institution exempt only under section 703(e)(2) would be subject to those requirements. But, the limited range of employer practices covered under
the two exemptions 60 makes this reading impractical. Courts have not
read the two exemptions in this way and have given no indication that
they might. Thus, this may be a distinction without a difference.
There does appear to be some amount of clear, perhaps explainable,
overlap between the two exemptions. Still, the language in each section
is not identical, leaving room for differing judicial interpretation. As a
result, some questions of the reach of the exemptions coincide, while
others are unique to the specific section.

56. See, e.g., Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d 111, 124-25 n. 9 (Md. 2001)
(indicating that section 703(e)(2) "clarifies" section 702(a)); Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F.
Supp. 340, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The religious exemption [of section 703(e)(2)] is emphasized in
[section 702(a)] .... ).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2000).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-2(d) (2000).
60. The exemptions cover only religious discrimination and not discrimination on any other
protected characteristic. See infra Part ll.A.3.a.
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2. WHO IS COVERED UNDER THE EXEMPTIONS?

a. Institutions Owned, Operated, Controlled, Supported, Or Managed
By A Religious Organization
Just what kind of religious institution of higher education qualifies
for an exemption depends, in part, upon which exemption and upon

which part of a particular exemption the institution relies. An area of
significant overlap between the two sections is the coverage of religious
educational institutions under section 702(a) and institutions that are
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion under

section 703(e)(2). To determine qualification for each of those distincvariables, bations, courts look to a variety of institutional and doctrinal
6
sically utilizing a "totality of the circumstances" test. '
Obviously, the "owned, supported, controlled, or managed" lan-

guage in section 703(e)(2) requires a relationship of some sort with a
separate or affiliated religious organization (usually a specific faith, a
church or temple, a denomination, or a religious order). Though not
clearly mandated by its language, section 702(a) has been interpreted to

require a relationship or affiliation as well.62 Over the years, a trend has
developed regarding the treatment of different types of religious educa-

tional institutions. Seminaries as well as parochial elementary and secondary schools are usually presumed to have such a connection to their
affiliated religious organization .6 3 In contrast, whether such a relationship exists in religiously affiliated colleges and universities has been
61. See, e.g., Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) ("In
determining whether the College qualifies for the statutory exemption, the court must look at all the
facts to decide whether the College is a religious corporation or educational institution."); Killinger
v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 198 (11 th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate,
990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993) (mandating that "each case must turn on its own facts [to] determine whether the [institution's] purpose and character are primarily religious.") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); Tsirpanlis v. Unification Theological Seminary, 84 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1715 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Siegel v. Truett-McConnell Coll., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335,
1340 (N.D. Ga. 1994) ("In determining whether a college or school qualifies for the [703(e)(2)] exemption, all religious and secular characteristics must be weighed and considered."). See also Ralph
D. Mawdsley, Religious EducationalInstitutions: Limitations and Liabilities under ADEA and Title
VII, 89 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 30 (1994) ("[whether] an educational institution is church affiliated rather
than church controlled is decided by a consideration of the facts before the Court.").
62. See, e.g., Hall, 215 F.3d at 624-25; Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 461 n.7 (finding "no case
holding the exemption [in section 702(a)] to be applicable where the institution was not wholly or
partially owned by a church."); Wirth v. Coll. of the Ozarks, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1187 (W.D. Mo.
1998).
63. See Mawdsley, supra note 61, at 30.
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judged by numerous criteria, under the rubric of the totality of the cir-

cumstances. The factors upon which they are judged have included:
religious qualification requirements for and/or appointment by the affiliated religious organization of trustees, directors, or top administrators; 64 a declared religious pu6Tose or mission consistent with the affiliated religious organization; financial ties to the affiliated religious
organization; 66 a contractual expectation of religious orthodoxy or institutional policy favoring employment of members of a particular re68
67
ligion or religious• sect;
.69religious make-up of the student body; a
• the
pervasive religious atmosphere on campus; curricular or extracurricular religious requirements for students; recognition by other
government agencies (for example, the Internal Revenue Service or the
Department of Education) that the institution is religious; 7 1 and, affiliaorganizations or consortia of religious educational institution with
72
tions.

64. See Killinger, 113 F.3d at 199; Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 462; Pime v. Loyola Univ. of
Chi., 803 F.2d 351, 357 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring); Siegel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1341;
Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 627 F. Supp. 1499, 1501 (E.D. Wis. 1986), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987); Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 585 F. Supp. 435, 437 (N.D. Ill.
1984), affd on other grounds, 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986).
65. See Hall, 215 F.3d at 625; Killinger, 113 F.3d at 199; Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 462;
EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1980); Tsirpanlis, 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1715; Wirth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1187; Siegel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1342; Maguire, 627 F. Supp. at 1501.
66. See Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000); Killinger
v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 1989 (1 1th Cit. 1997); Pime, 803 F.2d at 357 (Posner, J., concurring); Siegel v. Truett-McConnell Coll., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1340-1341 (N.D. Ga. 1994);
Maguire, 627 F. Supp. at 1501.
67. See Killinger, 113 F.3d at 199; Miss. Coll., 626 F..2d at 479 n. 1; Maguire, 627 F. Supp. at
1501. One could question the validity of this criterion. In effect, it could be viewed as supporting a
claim to a right of religious preference by showing that the institution already practices a religious
preference. In reality, the criterion is probably more of an indication that the asserted preference is
serious and not a pretext for some other invidious intention.
68. See EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1993); Pime,
803 F.2d at 357 (Posner, J., concurring); Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 479; Siegel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at
1342.
69. See Hall, 215 F.3d at 625.
70. See Hall, 215 F.3d at 625; Killinger, 113 F.3d at 199; Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 462;
Pime, 803 F.2d at 357 (Posner, J., concurring); Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 479; Siegel, 13 F. Supp. 2d
at 1343.
71. SeeKillinger, 113 F.3dat 199; Wirth, 26 F. Supp. 2dat 1187.
72. See Wirth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (noting the College of the Ozarks' membership in the
Coalition for Christian Colleges and Universities, now the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, and the Association of Presbyterian Colleges and Universities).
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No single one of these criteria is sufficient to establish qualification,
nor - as discussed below - is the absence of any particular criterion dispositive of qualification.
The appropriate weight given to each criterion in determining
whether an institution is qualified for exemption is not entirely clear or
consistent. For example, significant financial assistance from a religious
organization with which the educational institution is affiliated is important. However, courts do not agree about what amount of assistance is
sufficient. Samford University's largest single source of funding was the
Alabama State Baptist Convention, which provided seven percent of the
University's total budget.7 3 Loyola University of Chicago's largest single
contributor was the Loyola Jesuit Community of Chicago, which provided one-third of one percent of the University's total budget.74 While
Samford's financial ties to the Alabama State Convention bolstered its
argument for exemption from Title VII by sections 702(a) and
703(e)(2), 75 Loyola's ties to the Jesuit community were viewed as de
minimis and did not support Loyola's exemption claim. 76 Consequently,
the amount of contribution relative to the total budget is more important
than how the contribution compares in amount to other contributions.
Yet, no reported case deals with a religious institution that receives more
than a small minority of its funding from its sponsoring church, order, or
denomination. Thus, it seems odd to expect a particular arbitrarily-set
amount of money to come from a religious organization. The largest
contributor, even if contributing only a small fraction of the overall operating budget, would exert an undeniable influence over the institution.
Nevertheless, both the court that decided Samford University's fate and
the court that addressed Loyola University's claim focused on the share
of the total budget. 77 As a result, it is difficult to discern at what level presumably somewhere between seven percent and one-third of one percent of the total budget - financial ties are too attenuated to contribute to
a finding of affiliation, ownership, or control.
Another example of the malleability of the criteria is the weight
given to an affiliated religious organization's control or influence over
trustees, directors, or top administrators of the institution. The number of
73.

Killingerv. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 199 (11 th Cir. 1997).

74.

Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351, 437 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Pime, 803 F.2d

at 357 (Posner, J., concurring) ("[F]inancial contributions from the Jesuit order provide only onethird of one percent of the university's income.").
75. Killinger, 113 F.3d at 199.

76. See Pime, 585 F. Supp. at 437.
77.

See Killinger, 113 F.3d at 201; Pime, 585 F. Supp. at 437.
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Jesuit trustees at both Loyola University and Marquette University is required to be sufficient to afford the Jesuits veto power over any by-law
amendment if the Jesuit trustees vote as a bloc. 78 This fact was insignifi79
cant to the judge deciding whether Loyola qualified for exemption,
but
80
qualification.
Marquette's
deciding
judge
the
was significant to
Consequently, with any test that considers the totality of the circumstances, it is simply impossible to determine a bright-line rule by
which a religiously-affiliated institution of higher education can determine its eligibility for the exemptions. In Killinger v. Samford University,s a leading case interpreting the language of section 703(e)(2), the
Eleventh Circuit approached the exemption more rigidly and offered a
glimmer of hope to religiously affiliated institutions of higher education
that endeavor to determine their eligibility under that section. Relying on
the disjunctive language of 703(e)(2), the court determined that the section "requires only that a college be - 'in whole or substantial part' -8 2
'owned, supported, controlled, or managed' by a religious association.
The court proceeded to give the word substantial its ordinary meaning
and determined that the financial support from the Alabama State Baptist
Convention to Samford University was, by itself, enough for the University to qualify for the exemption.8 3 The logical implication of the Killinger decision is that no multi-factored test is necessary to determine eligibility under section 703(e)(2). Rather, an institution qualifies by meeting
any one of the requirements of ownership, support, control, or management. In contrast, section 702(a) allows for no such litmus test, but instead looks to all of the circumstances for an overall impression of religious affiliation.

78. See Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 627 F. Supp. 1499, 1501 (E.D. Wis. 1986), affid in part
and vacated in part, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987).
79. See Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351, 440 (7th Cir. 1986)(finding that the Jesuit

community exercised no actual direction or control over the Jesuit trustees and administrators).
80.
81.

Maguire, 627 F. Supp. at 1501.
113F.3d196(IlthCir. 1997).

82. Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 200 (1 th Cir. 1997).
83. Id. at 201 ("We hold... that Samford qualifies as an educational institution which is in
'substantial part' supported by a religious association and that the exemption protects Samford in
this case."). See also Siegel v. Truett-McConnell Coll., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1340-41 (N.D.

Ga. 1994) (finding that $714,934 in support from the Georgia Baptist Convention, and other Baptist
associations and churches, to Truett McConnell College was "substantial support by a particular
religion" even though "the College receives financial support from other sources" and noting that
the money from the Convention "is enough to pay the salaries and benefits of 19 of the 25 full time
faculty at the College's Cleveland campus").
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b. The Curriculum Exemption
Section 703(e)(2) also exempts educational institutions that have religious curricular goals, even in the absence of any ownership, support,
control, or management by a religion or religious organization. These
"independent" religious schools qualify for an exemption if their "cur84
riculum ...is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.,
Unfortunately, the only federal court opinion to construe the "curriculum
exemption" clause of section 703(e)(2) in a serious and thoughtful way,8 5
undermined the protections provided by it. In EEOC v. Kamehameha
Schools/Bishop Estate,86 a panel oof the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Kamehameha Schools in Hawaii were not eligible for the
curriculum exemption, despite a significant Protestant tradition at the
schools. 87 The district court in that case held that the Kamehameha
Schools were eligible for the exemption because "religion ...is an integral part of the child's daily life at the [s]chools. ''88 The circuit court
panel disagreed, commenting that "religion is more a part of the general
tradition of the [s]chools than a part of their mission, and serves primarily as a means for advancing moral values in the context of a general
89
education."
This holding is striking considering the facts of Kamehameha.
Every student was required to fulfill a religious education component of
the curriculum. 90 The court called this requirement "limited" 9 1; however,
that characterization is disputable. Structured religious instruction occurred from kindergarten through sixth grade; a religious education
teacher taught the classes utilizing Bible stories, prayer, and religious
singing.92 Only inthe seventh and eighth grades did the religious educa-

84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2000).
85. EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 464 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 963 (1993) ("There is no case law on the curriculum exemption.").
86. Id.
87. Id. at 464-65. The schools had been established by Bernice Pauahi Bishop, a member of
the Hawaiian royal family, through a charitable trust upon her death. The provision of her will establishing the trust for the purpose of building and maintaining the schools instructed the trustees to
"provide... a good education in the common English branches, and also instruction in morals and
in such useful knowledge as may tend to make good and industrious men and women." Id. at 459.
She further instructed that "the teachers of said schools shall forever be persons of the Protestant
religion." Id. The case arose when a non-Protestant was denied a substitute teaching position. Id.
88. Id. at 464 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
89. Id. at 465.
90. Id. at 463.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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tion begin to take on less of a purely Christian orientation.9 3 At these
grade levels, classes dealt with the nature of God and religion and the
history of religion in Hawaiian culture.94 Students in the high school
were required to complete a minimal amount of religious coursework,
and all students attended devotional services every other week. 95 Furthermore, all classes from kindergarten through eighth grade recited a
mandatory daily prayer.96 Finally, some official school events and activities incorporated religious practices.91 Nevertheless, the court found the
curriculum exemption inapplicable.9 8
The court's decision can be explained in part by its use of an unreasonably restrictive definition for the word propagate.The court appropriately cited the dictionary definition of the word, but its application of
that definition to the facts was cramped and narrow. 99 Faced with the
preceding set of facts, the court determined that the "curriculum" of the
school - limiting what constituted "curriculum" "to coursework and required school activities"100 - did not really propagate Protestantism.
Notably, the court ignored that propagationcould and should be read to
"incorporate[] the holistic approach to life.., of the members of each
religious community." 10 1 In other words, the possibility of propagating
the Protestant viewpoint was not eliminated or even necessarily diminished simply because the school included within its curriculum a comparison of that viewpoint with other religious and cultural viewpoints.
Nor did it matter that the school, in accordance with the wishes of the
Bishop Estate, emphasized pride in traditional Hawaiian culture and history. Such studies do not automatically render the propagation of Protestantism impossible. Still, the court pointed to these factors as evidence
that the school's curricula were not directed at the propagation of a particular religion,10 2 despite the dominance of the Protestant viewpoint at
the school.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 462.
97. Id. (noting mandatory church attendance and prayer requirements for boarding students;
athletic team prayers; prayer at mandatory school functions; and Bible quotations on official school
publications).
98. Id. at 463-64.
99. Id. at 464 n.12.
100. Id. at464.
101. Araujo, supra note 18, at 727.
102. See EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1993).
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The impression left by the court is that the only way for an educational institution to qualify for the curriculum exemption is to develop a
singularly-focused curriculum that avoids anything resembling secular
study or culture. Apparently, the court determined that propagation of a
particular religion requires an institution to proselytize its students 10di-3
rectly in its particular religious beliefs in every curricular undertaking.
If so, the institution would be in the business of indoctrinating the students as opposed to educating them.10 4 Such aggressive and singleminded tactics, however, cannot be what is required under the curriculum exemption. Rather, to propagate means "to cause to spread out and
affect a greater number or greater area."' 5 Certainly, a religious educational institution can propagate a particular religion by presenting that
religion in a subtle manner, discussing both the tenets of the religion and
its historical and cultural contexts. While perhaps less marked than the
blunt approach of proselytizing, such a presentation would nonetheless
affect a number of people by the particular religious view. As a result,
that particular view would be spread. Guiding its students in understanding the place of a particular religion within the greater scheme of society
and history should not be interpreted as watering down the religious purpose of the institution as the Kamehameha court held.10 6 Instead, it
should be viewed as an alternative approach to propagation.
It may very well be that the holding in Kamehameha is narrow,
based on three peculiar circumstances of that case. First, the schools disavowed any effort to convert students to Protestantism.10 7 This admission certainly undermines a contention that the curriculum was intended
to propagate Protestant beliefs.10 8 Second, Kamehameha Schools argued
that it should not have been required to hire a non-Protestant because
that would violate the terms of the Bishop Trust, potentially rendering it
void. 0 9 Inasmuch as this claim reveals the true motivation of the Kamehameha Schools for denying non-Protestants teaching positions, a more
committed institution might be able to mount a better case. Finally, the
103.

See id.

104. For a more developed discussion of the difference between "indoctrination" and "education," see SANDIN, supra note 6, at 256.
105. Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 464 (quoting Webster's dictionary).
106. Id. at 465 ("Courses about religion and a general effort to teach good values do not constitute a curriculum that propagates religion..
107. See id. at 463.
108. This fact should not necessarily have been dispositive. It cannot be that an institution is
required to have as its mission the conversion of all students into co-religionists. A religion can affect a person without necessarily leading him to convert.
109. See EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 466 (9th Cir. 1993).
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court may not have known how to treat the broad and amorphous "Protestant" religious category under the exception." 0 The court noted that
the elementary religious education emphasized no particular religion, but
"[taught] the basic truths about how God and through his son Jesus
Christ teaches us how to live a joyous and fulfilling life."'' While this
sentiment is consistent with the belief statements of major Protestant denominations,' 2 the notion of a united Protestant belief system is foreign
to the religious history of the United States. 1 3 Perhaps if Kamehameha
employed only Lutherans or Methodists and presented the corresponding
particular view of Protestantism instead of purporting to represent the
more nebulous category of all Protestants, the outcome would have been
different.
The lasting implications of Kamehameha are unclear. 1 4 It is the
sole case interpreting the curriculum exemption. One commentator suggests that a broad reading of the case would require some kind of church
ownership or control over an educational institution for this exemption to
110. If the court was, in fact, confused by this aspect, its confusion may be warranted. "Protestant" does not so much denote the specific beliefs, but instead a historical origin of the religion. See,
e.g., THE OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY VOL. II 2335 (Compact ed. 1971) (defining "protestant" as
"a member or adherent of any of the Christian churches or bodies which repudiated the papal
authority, and' separated or were severed from the Roman communion in the Reformation of the sixteenth century, and generally of any of the bodies of Christians descended from them; hence in general language any Western Christian or member of a Christian church outside the Roman
Communion"). But see infra notes 111-1 15 and accompanying text discussing a case allowing a
broad "Christian" preference.
11. Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 463.
112. See, e.g., A Synopsis of the Beliefs of the Presbyterian Church in America, Official Website of the Presbyterian Church in America, at http://www.pcanet.org/general/beliefs.htm (last visited October 21, 2004); Essential Questions: Christianityand Lutheranism, Official Website of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, at http://www.elca.org/co/brief.html (last visited October
21, 2004); The Episcopal Church USA Visitors Center (containing a short synopsis of the Creeds
USA),
at
Episcopal
Church
of
the
.
and
beliefs
http://arc.episcopalchurch.org/welcome/belief/belief.html (last visited October 21, 2004); United
Church of Christ Statement of Faith - original version, Statement of Faith of the United Church of
Christ, at http://www.ucc.org/faith/faith.htm (last visited October 21, 2004); The Baptist Faith and
Convention,
at
Southern
Baptist
of
the
Official
Website
Message,
http://www.sbc.net/bfm/bftn2000.asp (last visited October 21, 2004); Our Beliefs, Official Website
of the Reformed Church of America, at http://www.rca.org/aboutus/beliefs/ (last visited October 21,
2004); About the UMC: Our Beliefs, Official Website of the United Methodist Church, at
=
http://www.umc.org/interior.asp?ptid l &mid=519 (last visited October 21, 2004).
113. See Sydney E. Ahlstrom, The Problem of the History of Religion in America, 39 CHURCH
HISTORY 224, 224-26 (Robert M. Grant et al. eds., 1970) (discussing the diversity of protestant - as
well as other - denominations and sects in colonial America).
114. The Supreme Court refused to review the Ninth Circuit's decision, therefore it is only
binding on the courts in the Ninth Circuit. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate v. EEOC, 510 U.S. 963
(1993) (denying certiorari to EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir.
1993)).
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apply."1 5 While this reading may stretch the logic.of the case to its breaking point, Kamehameha quite possibly could lead to a more restrictive
reading of the exemption than the statute's plain language requires. The
absence of cases discussing the curriculum exemption in the last ten
years may suggest both that institutions do not rely on it and that this
single interpretation of it has narrowed it to the point of insignificance.
Relying on a practical definition of "propagation," independent institutions of higher education should qualify for the curriculum exemption, so long as the curriculum and student life requirements include distinct religious influences, such as mandatory religious education
requirements or devotional service attendance. Allowing such an institution to impose religious requirements on its employees only furthers its
unique mission and supports inter-institutional diversity. A religious person's faith can, and usually does, affect his or her approach to the world.
In an atmosphere where that belief system is welcomed and required of
staff members, its influence can be far-reaching. A professor's religious
beliefs and faith often mandate a religious approach to teaching a subject
traditionally considered secular.1 16 The Ninth Circuit, in disallowing the
Protestant requirement of the Bishop Estate, made such an atmosphere
less likely. Any propagation of Protestantism that had occurred at the
schools became more difficult to accomplish. 1 7 After Kamehameha, independent religious institutions of higher education can no longer be certain of their qualification for the curriculum exemption if they offer more
than a purely sectarian education." 8 Remaining true to a religious mission, therefore, becomes a greater challenge. The cause of maintaining
vibrant diversity among institutions of higher education took a blow
from the Kamehameha court.

115. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Employment Discriminationon the Basis of Religion: Where Should
the Line Be Drawn?, Ill EDUC. L. REP. 1077, 1085 (1996).

116. See Araujo, supra note 18, at 752-53. The author of this article can attest, at least anecdotally, to this statement. Having attended a pervasively religious undergraduate institution, a pervasively secular law school, and having taught at a public university, the differences in student/teacher
interaction and faculty teaching philosophies and techniques are striking.
117. Cf Mawdsley, supra note 5, at 1108-09 ("To suggest that the business of the religious
university is primarily meeting the secular function of providing educational services ignores the
religious intensity with which some such universities may view their religious mission and appears
to assume that a religious university can afford either economically or philosophically to have some
employees who do not have to share in that religious intensity.") (citations omitted).
118. Presumably, independent bible colleges, seminaries, and other similar institutions where
the entire curriculum is focused on religious education or the training of clergy, would easily meet
the Kamehameha court's requirements. Also, faculty members at such institutions are likely to fall
under the ministerial exception to Title VII. See infra Part Il.
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3. WHAT IS COVERED UNDER THE EXEMPTIONS?
Knowing which religious institutions of higher education qualify
for the exemption under sections 702(a) and 703(e)(2) is only the first
step in understanding the coverage of the exemptions. Only certain employment practices are exempted, while other practices remain proscribed by Title VII even to religious employers. Separating those practices, though at times complicated, is the same under both sections. The
main ambiguities in the exemptions are the reach of what it means to
"hire and employ" or make a decision regarding "employment" and what
it means for an employee to be "of a particular religion." The following
section gives a quick overview of the important issues that are implicated by the use of these ambiguous terms.
a. Religious Discrimination Only
Congress by no means created a blanket exemption from Title VII
for institutions that qualify under either section 702(a) or section
703(e)(2). Instead, the sections allow qualified employers to make decisions based on one of the proscribed criteria. The exemptions allow employers to limit consideration of and continued employment to individuals and employees "of a particular religion" 1 9; however, nothing in the
exemptions excuses an employer from the Title VII prohibitions on race,
sex, or national origin discrimination. Only discrimination on the basis
of religion was exempted.12 0 As a result, a religious institution of higher
education that is otherwise qualified for the exemptions can lawfully restrict employment to co-religionists, though it is by no means bound to
do so. That, however, fails to account for numerous other preferences
and practices in which the institutions might wish to engage.
Determining whether a person is a co-religionist presents a difficult
undertaking. For instance, like the Kamehameha Schools' Protestant
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2002-e2(e) (2000).
120. See EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 484 (5th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the
N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701 (E.D.N.C. 1999) ("Al-

though [section 702(a)] permits religious institutions to discriminate based on religion or religious
preferences, Title VII does not permit religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of race,
sex, or national origin."); Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)

("These exceptions to Title VII do not sanction gender discrimination, except where, for example,
only men can be priests, as required for certain religious functions."). See also Joanne C. Brant,
"Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate,
21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 290-91 (1994) ("[N]othing in Title VII supports the right of a reli-

gious employer to engage in sex or racial discrimination.").
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preference discussed in the previous section, the announced preferences
or affiliations of religious educational institutions do not always lend
themselves to easy distinctions between fellow believers and nonbelievers. An example of this phenomenon involved the College of the
Ozarks in Missouri. In Wirth v. College of the Ozarks,12 1 a professor at
the college alleged that he had been denied pay raises over a seven-year
period and, ultimately, was terminated at least in part because he was
Catholic. 22 The professor argued that the College of the Ozarks was not
entitled to exemption under sections 702(a) or 703(e)(2), because its
president's affidavit indicated that the college endorsed no single denomination of Christianity, but noted that "a strong belief in Christianity
is practiced."1 23 As a result, Professor Wirth argued that, as a Catholic,
his views were also Christian and the college could not suggest his termination was exempted by Title VII. 124 The court rejected this argument,
explaining:
Even though a Christian corporation or organization is nondenominational, it nevertheless may subscribe to particular religious
views with which other Christians do not agree, and conversely, it may
disagree with the religious views of other Christians.... [T]he exempbeliefs
tions allow religious institutions to employ only persons whose
125
are consistent with the views of the religious organization.
Thus, while "Christianity" is clearly a broad descriptor for the religion or religious preference of an institution, this court endorsed the notion that a religious institution could choose, without violating Title VII
to hire and to employ only those individuals who endorse or adopt the
specific beliefs and views among the many competing conceptions of a
particular belief system. 126 This approach is clearly deferential to the institution's own conception of its religious mission and views.
A seemingly reasonable approach to ferreting out those coreligionists that an institution seeks to employ would be to allow qualified institutions to employ people who understand the mission of the institution and who are willing to comport with the behavior standards associated with the particular religion.127 Even this definition involves
121.
122.
123.
124.

26 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1188.
Id.

125.

Id.

126. See id.
127. See Treaver Hodson, Note, The Religious Employer Exemption Under Title VII Should a
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some uncertainty. For example, it is unclear whether an institution may
lawfully prefer a candidate for employment who has voiced support for
the mission of the religious institution over a candidate who remains silent on the issue, regardless of the religious beliefs or background of either candidate. 12 8 The former candidate would not have been preferred
because she was "of a particular religion," but because of her willingness
to encourage the religious mission. The latter candidate could very well
have remained silent because, though perfectly willing to refrain from
undermining the mission, his differing religious beliefs forbid him from
encouraging the mission. The result could be characterized as discrimination on the basis of religion, though not a preference for a person of a
particular religion.
Additionally, it seems reasonable that an employee's failure to live
up to and support the religious behavioral and moral mandates of the
particular religion could constitute valid grounds for discharge. 129 Nevertheless, the circuits are split regarding how broadly to apply that ideal
when those mandates require or result in other forms of discrimination.130 Nowhere has this been more evident than in cases involving the
discharge of an unmarried female employee when she becomes pregnant.
Various religions proscribe premarital and extra-marital sexual activity.
Often, pregnancy outside of a marriage is considered by such religions to
be conclusive evidence of sin.131 Therefore, when a religious institution
fires a pregnant, but unmarried, female employee, it can theoretically do
so based on religious grounds (i.e., failure to abide by the religion's sexual, moral, and behavioral expectations). However, the employer would
have engaged in sex discrimination. 32 if the firing was because of the
Church Define Its Own Activities? 1994 BYU L. REv. 571, 575 (1994).
128. Father Robert John Araujo points out this open question and offers an approach by which
a religious school could lawfully engage in such a preference. He calls his plan religious affirmative
action/apostolic preference. Araujo, supra note 18, at 737, 768-778. Villanova University's plan for
"Mission Centered Hiring" reflects some aspects of this approach. See VILLANOVA UNIV., GUIDE
FOR FACULTY SEARCH COMMITTEES 5-8 (Rev. Draft, Ver. 5) (outlining the goals of Mission Centered Hiring, instructing faculty hiring committees about ways to educate candidates about Villanova's mission, and suggesting interview questions that allow candidates to share their views about
and support of the mission), available at http://www3.villanova.edu/missionmchiring/hiring5.pdf
(n.d.).
129. See Araujo, supra note 18, at 732 (citing Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) and
EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, 788 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1992)).
130. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.3 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (describing this developing split in the circuits).
131. As is often the case, technology outpaces legal reasoning. Although no case has presented
such facts, an unmarried woman in the twenty-first century can become pregnant without engaging
in intercourse (i.e., artificial insemination).
132. Following a series of restrictive Supreme Court cases declaring discrimination on the basis
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pregnancy itself and not the proscribed sexual behavior that led to the
pregnancy. 133
Some circuit courts have declared that when a religious educational
institution offers a religious reason for discharging a pregnant employee,
the court is then stripped, by means of the exemptions, of its ability to
hear the case.134 Other circuits disagree. They suggest that in proffering a
religious reason for the decision, the institution does no more than meet
its burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the firing within the structure of the Title VII burden-shifting case. 35 As such,
the employee is given the opportunity to prove the religious reason is
pretext for sex discrimination.1 36 Clearly, the doctrine prohibiting premarital sex is not subject to a court's review for its merit as a religious
tenet. Such an inquiry would violate the First Amendment. 137 Nevertheless, the latter approach forces the religious educational institution to
prove that its decision was actually based upon the religious reason. The
former approach relieves the institution even of this responsibility.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the split in the circuits, the latter approach is grounded in a sounder construction of the exemptions. The former approach exaggerates the constitutional concerns
at issue. So long as the court accepts the religious belief or doctrine at
face value, no First Amendment issue arises. 3 8 The exemptions are still
important even if the institution must defend its position as required by
of pregnancy not to be a proxy for sex discrimination, Congress amended Title VII with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994), to state that "the terms 'because of sex' or
'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy." Id.
133. For example, if the employer knew that the father of the child of the subject pregnancy
was also an unmarried employee, but failed to terminate the father, an obvious conclusion is that
religious doctrine* was not the motivating factor for the termination of the female employee, but
rather her pregnancy was.
134. See, e.g., Little, 929 F.2d at 948 (citing and quoting from EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d
477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980).
135. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglassets up
what has been referred to as the "three-step" minuet of a disparate treatment case under Title VII.
First, the plaintiff must establish a primafaciecase for discrimination. If the plaintiff establishes the
basic elements of a primafacie case, then the defendantcarries the burden of offering a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision regarding the plaintiff. If the defendant carries its burden,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff who must show that the proffered reason is a pretext for the
discriminatory reason. Id. at 804. See also PLAYER, supra note 39, at § 5.40 (expounding on the burden shifting model established in McDonnell).
136. See, e.g., Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996);
Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at808,
810 (denying summary judgment and ordering a trial by a jury to determine whether pregnancy or
religion was the reason for dismissal of librarian at religious school).
137. See Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 350.
138. Id.
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the latter approach. The proffered religious reason for the decision would
not be considered legitimate and nondiscriminatory if the exemptions did
not operate to excuse decision-making on that basis. In other words, only
those institutions that fall under the exemptions in sections 702(a) and
703(e)(2) have the option of offering a religious reason as a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for the action taken. As a result, religious
institutions of higher education can, in some circumstances, defend
against claims of discrimination based on sex by showing that the decision was, in fact, based on religious considerations.
Whether the same can be said of race or national origin is not as
clear. If an employee of a religious institution of higher education were
fired for involvement in an interracial relationship, the public policy of
eradicating race discrimination may outweigh any respect for religious
liberty contained in the Title VII exemptions. 39 Even if the institution
adhered to a sincerely held religious belief about the inappropriateness14 of
intermingling races, a court may declare such an interest illegitimate. 0
b. Employment Practices
Title VII prohibits much more than just the hiring and firing of individual employees on the basis of race, sex, religion, and national origin. According to section 703(a)(1)1 41, it is also unlawful to discriminate
with regard to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."' 142 The exemption in section 702(a) reads only that "this subchapter shall not apply.., with respect to the employment of individuals
of a particular religion."'143 Section 703(e)(2) reads that "it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice... to hire and employ employees of a
particular religion.' 44 Neither section mentions anything about compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges.

139. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Limiting the Right of Religious EducationalInstitutions to Discriminate on the Basis of Religion, 94 EDUC. L. REP. 1123, 1135-36 (1994) (arguing that eradicating
discrimination based on race is a fundamental public policy that overrides any sincerely held religious belief).
140. In a different setting, the Supreme Court determined that a racially discriminatory admissions policy based on a sincerely held religious belief did not excuse a religious institution of higher
education from complying with anti-discrimination norms found in the federal tax code and the institution lost its tax exempt status. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
142.

Id.

143.
144.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (1994).
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Because neither of these sections identically tracks the language of
section 703(a)(1), it is reasonable to assume that not all employment decisions are exempted under sections 702(a) and 703(e)(2). The most restrictive approach is to suggest that only the decision of whether to hire
1 45
or not to hire an individual would be included in the exemptions. 146
While courts may treat hiring and discharge decisions differently,
courts have applied the exemptions both to decisions to discharge an
employee and to hire an employee.' 47 The EEOC admits that section
702(a)'s use of "employment" encompasses both hiring and firing, but
also contends that section 702(a) does not include terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. 148 It is reasonable to conclude that the exemptions do not cover discrimination in compensation, benefits, insurance,
and other similar employment practices on the basis of religion. The
Ninth Circuit has so held149; however, the Ninth Circuit has historically
taken a restrictive view of the exemptions 5 ° and other circuits may not
follow its lead.
The most intriguing ambiguity, not contemplated by the Ninth Circuit in its restrictive interpretation, nor directly addressed by the EEOC,
is whether promotions are covered by the use of the words "employment" and "hire and employ" in the exemptions. Promotions could be
considered a privilege of employment. 15' Furthermore, if an institution
hires someone who is not of its particular religion, then one can argue
that the institution has declared its approval of that person. The question
becomes whether that initial approval should constrain the institution
from refusing to promote that person beyond a certain level. To answer
in the affirmative, one must ignore the varying degrees of importance
that many institutions may place on the religion of the people filling different positions or fulfilling different responsibilities. 152 It may be unimportant to an institution whether a remedial writing instructor shares the
145. See Brant, supra note 120, at 285 (detailing this restrictive "hiring-only" approach to interpreting the statutes).
146. See Mawdsley, supra note 5, at 1106-07 (explaining that courts will probe discharge decisions more thoroughly than decisions not to hire).
147. See, e.g., Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Killinger v Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 198 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944,
951 (3d Cir. 1991).
2183, at 2341, 2343
148. Religious Organization Exemption, EEOC Comp. Man. (CCH)
(2004).
149. EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1986).
150. For example, see supranotes 85-118 and accompanying text regarding the Ninth Circuit's
overly-narrow interpretation of the curriculum exemption.
151. See McClure, supra note 51, at 616-18 and cases noted therein.
152. Seeid.at621.
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institution's religious commitment because he is only marginally associated with the institution and has a limited public profile. The same cannot be said of tenured faculty members or high-ranking administrators.
Whether promotions are included in the exemptions is of vital importance to religious institutions of higher education when making the decision of whether to grant, or to deny, tenure to a faculty member.
Title VII should not require a religious college or university to grant
tenure to a non-tenured faculty member without regard to his religion.
That is simply consistent with the intent of the exemptions. The ministerial exception 1 3 to Title VII would cover certain of those positions, but a
majority of faculty positions at religious institutions of higher education
would not fall under that exception. Therefore, tenure decisions should
be included within the exemptions, because tenure decisions and promotions generally are considered to be appointments to a new position
rather than promotions.
c. Exemption Available to All Employers: The Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification Defense of Section 703(e)(1)
Title VII also offers all employers an opportunity to avoid liability
under the Act by proving that the position, by its very character, requires
discrimination. The defense is set forth in section 703(e)(1). 15 4 That section provides the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, [] it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees.., on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin
in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessaryto the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise....
On its face, section 703(e)(1), or the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense as it is commonly known, provides no special
protection for a religious educational institution per se. Nevertheless, it
can provide protection from liability under Title VII for religious institutions of higher education in the limited circumstances available to all
employers under the act. The defense is likely, similar to the exemptions
specific to religious educational institutions, to protect the institution
153. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion of the ministerial exception.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
155. Id.
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only from decisions on the basis of religion.156 The BFOQ defense be-

comes particularly significant when sections 702(a)57and 703(e)(2) are either inapplicable or, for some reason, not invoked.1
The BFOQ defense is quite limited in its scope and application.'5 8
Unlike sections 702(a) and 703(e)(2) 5 9, the BFOQ defense clearly
places the burden on the employer to establish its application and defend

against a claim of pretext. 60 Therefore, the BFOQ defense is seldom relied upon by religious educational institutions as the sole basis to avoid
liability. Notwithstanding its paucity of use by religious institutions of
higher education, courts have identified several issues involved that
should be of special note to such employers.
Any successful BFOQ defense must show that the asserted qualifi-

cation is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [the] particular business or enterprise" in question. 16' This requirement is judged by
several criteria, including whether employees with the same qualification
fill similar positions to the one in question; whether the BFOQ defense
itself is applied consistently in a nondiscriminatory manner; and whether
the qualification is applied to an employment decision covered in the
section. 162 Furthermore, to qualify as a BFOQ, the discriminatory quali-

fication must "relate to the essence or to the central mission of the em-

156. Section 703(e)(1) applies as a defense to sex and national origin discrimination as well
(though not to race discrimination). Id. It is unlikely that a religious institution could meet the requirements of the defense on those bases. At any rate, any such invocation would presumably have
little to do with protecting or furthering the institution's religious character, and is therefore beyond
the scope of this article.
157. See, e.g., Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 585 F. Supp. 435, 441-43 (E.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd
803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding for defendant, a Jesuit institution, on the basis of BFOQ, but
rejecting the applicability of section 703(e)(2)).
158. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
159. See supra notes 120-135 and accompanying text.
160. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). See also Susan J.
Curry, et. al., Case Comment, Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago: The Seventh Circuit Extends the
BFOQ Defense, 14 J.C. & U.L. 607, 610 (1988) ("[C]ourts place upon the employer the burden to
show entitlement to the BFOQ defense.").
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
162. Curry, supra note 160, at 610-611. Curry argues that the third of these considerations dictates that the BFOQ defense applies only to employment decisions regarding hiring, discharge, or
"employment opportunities." Id.This reading of the statute is followed in EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986). There the court found that the BFOQ defense could not
apply to a decision to discriminate on the basis of religion in the provision of health insurance benefits. Id. at 1367.
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ployer's business., 163 That mission, though, cannot be 1determined by
simple reference to customers' or colleagues' preferences. 64
These verbal formulae add little to the understanding of the true
scope and function of the defense. How then would a religious institution
of higher education go about invoking a successful BFOQ defense? The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals directly addressed the application of
the BFOQ defense in that context. In Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago, 65 a panel of the circuit court affirmed a district court judgment
finding that Loyola University asserted a valid BFOQ by reserving three
tenure-track faculty positions in its philosophy department to be filled by
members of the Catholic Jesuit order, the founding order of the University. The Jesuit requirement was upheld as a BFOQ for the purpose of
maintaining a significant Jesuit presence in the department "so that students would occasionally encounter a Jesuit."' 166 The court, however,
failed to offer any analysis of the BFOQ defense. Instead, the majority
simply quoted the "reasonably necessary" language of the statute. Moreover, the court determined that reserving three open positions to retain a
ratio of seven Jesuit to twenty-four non-Jesuit tenured faculty in the department was a reasonable method for maintaining a Jesuit presence.167
Unfortunately, because Pime generally lacks serious substantive
analysis, the opinion offers little practical guidance. First, the court allowed the success of the BFOQ defense to hang on the declaration of the
school that a Jesuit presence in the philosophy department was important, rather than on any objective measure of the necessity of that presence to the normal operation of Loyola University.1 68 In that vein, the
EEOC maintains that Pime is no longer valid because it fails to consider
whether the claimed BFOQ requirement was the essence of or central to
Loyola's mission.1 69 These criticisms, however, are specific to the Pime
opinion and do not undermine the ability of religious institutions of
higher education to invoke the BFOQ defense successfully. Although the

163.

UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 203 (1991) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).
164. See, e.g., Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 n.4 (N.D.

Cal. 1992).
165.
166.

803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 354.

167. Id.
168. Id. ("It is true that it has not been shown that Jesuit training is a superior academic qualification, applying objective criteria, to teach the particular courses.").
169.

See EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 466 (9th Cir. 1993). The

centrality or essence test was announced in Johnson Controls,499 U.S. at 203, six years after Pime
was decided. See supranote 163 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol22/iss1/1

30

Prenkert: Liberty, Diversity, Academic Freedom, and Survival: Preferential31

2004]

LIBERTY, DIVERSITY, ACADEMIC FREEDOM,AND SURVIVAL

centrality and essence were not directly considered by the Pime court,
one could easily imagine a court finding that the mission of Loyola University is actually to provide an education grounded in the Jesuit tradition. Maintaining a significant Jesuit presence on campus could very
well be central to that mission, especially in departments like philosophy, which are marked by contemplation about the human experience
and the nature of humankind.
The most piercing criticism of Pime, though, comes directly from
the concurring opinion of Judge Posner. He contends that the majority
does a disservice to Loyola University and employment discrimination
170
law generally by relying on the BFOQ defense to dispose of the case.
Instead, he explained that the case should have been dismissed for the
plaintiff's failure to present a prima facie case of employment discrimination. 171 Because the Jesuits are an order within the Catholic Church,
being a Jesuit is not formally a religious criterion, according to Judge
Posner.' 72 The requirement discriminated equally against non-Jesuit
Catholics and non-Catholics.173 While initially employers might have
been tempted to applaud this expansion of the BFOQ defense, there is a
danger. It actually exposes defendants to more intrusive litigation. For
example, if a religious college reserves certain positions for members of
a particular religious order, then that college must defend against a claim
of religious discrimination by proving that the requirement is reasonably
necessary to its normal operation. 7 4 On the other hand, if the case had
been dismissed by summary judgment because the plaintiff had failed to
prove a prima facie case, then the institution would not have been required to defend the merits of reserving religious-based slots.' 75
Subsequent cases and commentary help to clarify what type of evidence a religious institution of higher education must present in order to
be protected by the BFOQ defense. Generally, the institution must show
that the religion or religious beliefs of the employee are intimately tied to
170. See Pime, 803 F.2d at 354-55 (Posner, J., concurring).
171. Id.at354.
172. Id. at 355.
173. Id. at 354 ("It is hard to believe that the philosophy department of the University of Chicago - or of Brandeis University - would be guilty of a prima facie violation of Title VII if it reserved a few slots for Jesuits, believing that the Jesuit point of view on philosophy was one to which
its students should be exposed; and Loyola should have the same right."). See also Curry, supranote
160, at 612 (arguing that either the case was decided wrongly on BFOQ grounds or the opinion must
be interpreted as expanding the BFOQ defense to apply not only to religion but also to religious order).
174. This assumes, of course, that the institution would not qualify for exemption under sections 702(a) or 703(e)(2).
175. Curry, supra note 160, at 618-19.
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the responsibilities of the position. Those qualifications, in turn, must be
reasonably necessary to the successful implementation of the institutional mission and goals. 176 Specifically, for a religious requirement to
be accepted as a BFOQ, more is required of a religious institution of
higher education than simply relying on the fact that the faculty members are expected to serve as models of exemplary religious lives. Not
only must the faculty members be expected to model moral behavior and
religious orthodoxy, but they must also have a role in monitoring the religious practices or religious education of their students. '77
This restrictive interpretation of the BFOQ defense has enjoyed
support in case law. For example, a religion requirement for a private religious school's religion teachers has been accepted as a BFOQ, but the
same requirement for the school's teachers of "secular" subjects was
not. 78 Similarly, a religious school that fired its librarian for engaging in
pre-marital sexual intercourse - evidenced by her out-of-wedlock pregnancy - was denied summary judgment on its BFOQ defense. The
school contended
that the employee's position required she serve as a
"role model,"'179 making moral and chaste behavior a BFOQ. 180 The
court stated that the issue would have to be litigated to determine "how
central [plaintiff's] moral life was to her job as librarian, whether or not
she was truly expected to act as a role model in the [legal] sense, and
what impact her pregnancy
truly had on her ability to perform either of
l
those functions.''
The narrow BFOQ defense is of limited utility to religious institutions of higher education. They must be able to show that religion is intimately tied to an employee's position in the institution's overall mission. Most positions for which the BFOQ defense might apply would be

176. See Araujo, supra note 18, at 733-34 (listing the Congressional requirements of a successful BFOQ defense).
177. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Are Non-Church ControlledEducational Institutions Still Entitled to Title VII Religious Exemptions?, 87 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 12 (1994) ("If a BFOQ is to be available as a defense for employment of faculty under Title VII, [a recent case] requires not only that
faculty engage in a prescribed course of conduct, but also that they be the active pedagogical conduits of that conduct to students.").
178. EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 466 (9th Cir. 1993).
179. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d
697 (8th Cir. 1987), held that, "the role model rule qualifies as a [BFOQ]." Id at 705. Several programs involved activities aimed at pregnancy prevention and the plaintiff, a single woman, was fired
by the club when she informed them of her pregnancy. Id. at 699. Based on the particular circumstances of the case, the court concluded that "the role model rule is reasonably necessary to the
club's operations." Id. at 705.
180. Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., of Dublin, Cal., 805 F.2d 802, 808 (N.D. Cal 1992).
181. Id. at 809.
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just as likely to fall under one of the more specific exemptions found in
sections 702(a) and 703(e)(2). Nevertheless, the defense allowed Loyola
University to maintain its Jesuit presence in its philosophy department,112 permitted Loyola to protect its unique character as a Jesuit institution, and preserved a small part of the overall diversity of higher education.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Courts 183 and commentators 84 have long struggled with the constitutional implications of applying Title VII to the religious sector with re182. See Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351, 354 (7th Cir. 1986).
183. See generally Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330, 349 (1987) (dealing with First Amendment implications of Title
VII as applied to nonprofit activities of religious organizations, though not passing on the implications on for-profit activities); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 702-03
(7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the First Amendment prohibits the court from deciding national origin
and gender discrimination claims by Hispanic Communications Manager for the Archdiocese of
Chicago); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 651, 658-59 (10th Cir.
2002) (finding that the First Amendment prohibits the court from being involved in a sexual harassment claim by a gay minister against the church); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh,
N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 797, 802 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment bars the court from considering the sex discrimination claim of a female music teacher
against a church); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11 th
Cir. 2000) (concluding that the First Amendment prohibits "a church from being sued under Title
VII by its clergy."); Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173
F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e cannot conceive how the federal judiciary could determine
whether an employment decision concerning a minister was based on legitimate or illegitimate
grounds without inserting ourselves into a realm where the Constitution forbids us to tread .. ");
Bollard v. Calif. Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that the First
Amendment does not prohibit a court from hearing sexual harassment claims from a ministerial employee); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 465, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that the
First Amendment prohibits Title VII sex discrimination claims and EEOC's investigation of that
claim involving denial of tenure to canon law professor at Catholic University); Young v. N. Ill.
Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that civil courts
are not competent to resolve "religious controversies"); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 361 (8th Cir. 1991) (dismissing on First Amendment grounds ADEA and
Title Vll claims filed by hospital chaplain); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that courts are generally not permitted to review
ecclesiastical decisions); EEOC v. S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284-85 (5th
Cir. 1985) (holding that First Amendment exempts seminary from EEOC filing requirements
regarding particular ministerial employees); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that the First Amendment does not exempt a sectarian college from coverage under Title
VII with regard to employees performing secular functions); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d
553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) ("We find that the application of the provision of Title VII to the employment relationship existing between ... a church and its minister would result in an encroachment by
the State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.").
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gard to conduct or institutions that fall outside the statutory exemptions.
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."185 The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause protect individuals and society from important, but distinct, aspects of governmental encroachment
on religious liberty. These concerns arise when courts apply Title VII to
constrain religious institutions from making unencumbered employment
decisions. The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from becoming excessively entangled with a religious institution and its administration, as may happen in the case of a Title VII employment discrimination claim or investigation. The Free Exercise Clause protects
religious individuals and, relevant to this discussion, institutions from
certain governmentally imposed burdens on the exercise of that religion.
This may occur when the government constrains a religious organization
from making an unquestioned decision about who may act on its behalf
as an employee. Consequently, under certain circumstances, these
constitutional protections may relieve religious institutions of higher
education from the dictates of Title VII.
A. The MinisterialException
Courts originally considered the constitutionality of Title VII as applied to religious institutions in the context of the traditional
church/clergy employment relationship. 86 Not long thereafter, however,
that inquiry expanded to consider employment relationships at other re-

184. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discriminationin the Name of the Lord: A CriticalEvaluation
of Discriminationby Religious Organizations, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979); Brant, supra note

120; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981); Ira C. Lupu,
Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67

B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987); Mawdsley, supra note 139; Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary
Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81

CORNELL L. REV. 1049 (1996); Laura L. Coon, Note, Employment Discriminationby Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based

Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 481 (2001); Mark F. Kohler, Comment, Equal Employment or Excessive Entanglement? The Application of Employment DiscriminationStatutes to Religiously Affiliated Organizations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 581 (1986); Shawna Meyer Eikenberry, Note,
Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying Court Access to MinisterialEmployees, 74 IND. L.J. 269
(1998).
185.

U.S. CONST., amend. 1.

186. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
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ligious institutions such as colleges and universities.'8 ' The principal
known as the "ministerial exception" to Title VII arose out of this inquiry. The ministerial exception relies on the premise that application of
Title VII to the employment relationship between a church and its ministers "result[s] in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious
freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment."' 88 The ministerial exception also
protects the religious employer from governmental entanglement in its
administration, which would violate the Establishment Clause.' 89 Therefore, courts assume that Congress did not intend Title VII and similar
statutes to cover the church/minister relationship.1 90 "T]he ministerial
exception is concerned with results, not motives" 91 ; hence, courts do not
question whether the religious employer's announced motive for an employment decision is pretextual. Indeed, a religious institution need not
announce any motive for its decision. Courts simply analyze whether a
covered relationship is involved. If it is, the court cannot, consistent with
the First Amendment, regulate that relationship.
The ministerial exception was first formulated and applied in
McClure v. Salvation Army,192 which involved a dispute between the
Salvation Army and one of its commissioned officers. An ordained minister, Billie McClure, was discharged from the Salvation Army after several years of training and service. 93 McClure claimed that the Salvation
Army had discriminated against her in the terms and conditions of her
employment on the basis of her sex and discharged her because of her
complaints to her superiors about the alleged discrimination. 94 The undisputed findings of fact of the district court determined that "[t]he Sal-

187.

See EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).

188. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
189.

See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (i1 th

Cir. 2000) ("[A]pplying Title VII to the employment relationship between a church and its clergy
would involve excessive government entanglement with religion as prohibited by the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Scharon v. St.
Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff's
Title VII claim is precluded because the resolution of her claim would require excessive entanglement in religious affairs in violation of the First Amendment).
190. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560-61 ("We therefore hold that Congress did not intend, through
the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church and minister.")
191. Charles J. Russo, The Camel's Nose in the Tent: JudicialIntervention in Tenure Disputes
at Catholic Universities, 117 EDUC. L. REP. 813, 823 (1997).

192. 460 F.2d at 560.
193. Id. at 555.
194. Id.
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vation Army is a church and Mrs. Billie B. McClure is one of its ordained ministers ....195
The court set out to determine "whether Title VII ...applies to the

employment relationship between a church and its ministers" and, if it
does, whether that is constitutional. 96 In dismissing the case, the court
relied on a line of cases declaring that civil courts had no place resolving
disputes involving church property; the so-called church autonomy line
of cases. 197 Similarly, the McClure court held that it could not constitutionally decide the case before it. To avoid passing on the constitutionality of Title VII as applied to the Salvation Army, the court determined
198
that Congress did not intend to cover the church/minister relationship.
This holding exempted the Salvation Army from having its employment
decisions regarding its "ministers" reviewed, irrespective of the basis for
that decision. In so doing, the court created the ministerial exception.
Though the McClure court was careful to limit its holding to the
facts of that case, it has had a much broader impact, primarily in the way
the opinion defined certain terms. Specifically, the ministerial exception's scope is largely determined by what religious institutions qualify
as "churches" and who, among their employees, qualify as "ministers."
1. WHAT IS A CHURCH?
Courts have interpreted the term church to include a diverse array
of religious institutions, not only the traditional notion of a group of individuals that regularly gather at a central location. 199 In fact, religiously
affiliated institutions including a hospital, 20 0 a seminary, 20 1 a Catholic
university 0 2 and a liberal arts college 20 3 have been held to fall within the

195. Id. at 554
196. Id.
197. See id. at 559. For a critique that the court incorrectly relied on these cases and announced
a rule based on constitutional assumptions rather than analysis, see Brant, supra note 120, at 293-96.
198. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560-61 (relying on the "cardinal principal" of statutory construction
announced in Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 348 (1936)).
199. See EEOC v. S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The
local congregation that regularly meets in a house of worship is not the only entity covered by our
use of the word 'church."').
200. See Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991).
201. See S.W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 279.
202. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
203. See Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Conn. 2000). Hartwig involves claims pursuant to Connecticut common law. Id. at 202. The court found that the ministerial
exception applies to state common law claims just as to Title VII. Id. at 209-10 n.12 ("[T]he Free

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol22/iss1/1

36

Prenkert: Liberty, Diversity, Academic Freedom, and Survival: Preferential

2004]

LIBERTY, DIVERSITY, ACADEMIC FREEDOM,AND SURVIVAL

37

ministerial exception. Not every religiously affiliated institution, however, is a church for purposes of the exception. Similar to sections 702(a)
and 703(e)(2), the institution must be somehow church-affiliated and
must be of "'substantial religious character.' 20 4 Courts focus on three
factors in determining whether a religiously affiliated institution is of
substantial religious character and, thus, a church for purposes of the
ministerial exception. Those factors are: control by a church (in the tradi-

tional sense) or some similar religious institution; 20 5 significant financial
support from the sponsoring church 20 6; and the purpose to serve a central

function of the sponsoring church.20 7 Therefore, some religiously affiliated institutions, though connected to a church or motivated by a religious commitment, are too loosely connected to qualify as "churches"
for purposes of the ministerial exception.20 8

Exercise Clause analysis discussed herein is applicable to common law causes of action as well as
Title VII.").
204. Scharon, 929 F.2d at 362 (quoting Lemon v. Kurzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971)). See
also Hartwig,93 F. Supp. 2d at 207 ("The [prior ministerial exception] decisions teach that the resolution of this question depends upon an examination of... the nature and extent of the religious
affiliation of the institution or business....").
205. See, e.g., Scharon, 929 F.2d at 362 (noting that the board of directors of the hospital consists of church representatives and their nominees and that the Articles of Association may not be
amended without church authorities' approval); S. W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283 (finding that the
seminary in question was wholly controlled by the Southern Baptist Convention, a voluntary coalition of Southern Baptist churches); Hartwig, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 211 (finding the liberal arts college
"closely affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church"); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 856 F.
Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting that the "Vatican retains the ultimate authority over the Canon
Law Department" at Catholic University), affd 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir 1996). But see EEOC v.
Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a college owned and operated by the
Mississippi Baptist Convention is not a church under the ministerial exception).
206. See, e.g., S.W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283 ("[T]he Seminary is principally supported... by
the Convention.").
207. See, e.g., Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 464 (finding that Catholic University's ecclesiastical
departments serve the purpose of teaching the doctrines and disciplines of the Catholic Church);
S. W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283 (noting that the "avowed purpose" of the seminary is to train Baptist
ministers).
208. Ralph Mawdsley, a former administrator at Liberty University, describes this analysis in a
different, but related, way. He suggests that courts evaluate an institution's "religiosity" along a continuum of decreasing relatedness to a traditional church. Mawdsley, supra note 61, at 30. The closer
the relationship, the more likely the institution will qualify for constitutional protection under the
ministerial exception. Id. He identifies three distinct points on the continuum, ranging from the most
likely to least likely to receive constitutional protection. Id. He calls the three types of institutions
that correspond to those points church controlled organizations, church affiliated organizations, and
non-church controlled or affiliated (though still religiously motivated) organizations. Id.
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2. WHO IS A MINISTER?
Institutions that qualify as churches under the ministerial exception
employ many individuals fulfilling varying tasks. 209 Before determining
if the ministerial exception applies to a particular employment relation-

ship, it is necessary to define what qualifies an employee as a minister.2 10
The answer is not always logically apparent. For example, ordination
was relevant to the fate of Billie McClure, who, as a commissioned offi-

cer, was an ordained clergy member of the Salvation Army.2 1' Notwithstanding that, ordination is neither necessary2 1 2 nor, by itself, suffi-

cient213 to qualify an employee as a minister.
The definition of a minister instead focuses largely on the functional role of the employee within the organization. 1 4 Only those posi-

tions that involve "activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious" '2t 5 may be considered ministerial. Thus, courts look to whether
"the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith,

church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or
participation in religious ritual and worship. ' 2t 6 Courts often focus on
209. Indeed, in order to even meet the definition of employer under Title VII, an organization
must have 15 or more employees for a sustained period. See supra note 24.
210. As an initial matter, the use of the term minister might seem to suggest it is only applicable to certain Protestant denominations and the other relatively few religious sects that use the term
ministerto describe their clergy. That, however, is certainly not the case. See Smith v. Raleigh Dist.
of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 704 n.7 (E.D.N.C.
1999) ("The court does not intend, by its adoption of the terminology 'church-minister' exception,
to suggest that this line of cases applies only to Protestant institutions and their clergy. The same
principles are equally applicable to other religious entities and their clergy, including rabbis, priests,
and imams.").
211. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972).
212. See Alicea-Hemandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003) ("In
determining whether an employee is considered a minister for the purposes of applying this exception, we do not look to ordination but instead to the function of the position."); Catholic Univ., 83
F.3d at 463-65 (finding that a non-ordained Catholic nun and professor of canon law was a minister); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir.
1985) ("The fact that an associate in pastoral care can never be an ordained minister in her church
is ...immaterial [to the ministerial exception].").
213. EEOC v. S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding
that ordained Baptist clergy working in the physical plant of seminary do not fall within the ministerial exception).
214. See EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Our inquiry
thus focuses on 'the function of the position' at issue and not on categorical notions of who is or is
not a 'minister."').
215. See S. W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284.
216. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. See also EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272,
1277 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that an editorial secretary in a publishing house run by the General
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists was not a minister because she served no religious function).
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the employee's relationship to the church and its members or followers.

If that relationship renders the employee an "intermediary" between the
two, she qualifies as a minister. 217 In particular, courts are deferential to
decisions regarding who speaks on behalf of the church.21 8 On the other
hand, an employee of a religious organization who attends to logistical
support, clerical administration, physical plant maintenance, and other
non-ecclesiastical or religious duties does not qualify.2 19 Consequently,
courts carefully scrutinize employees' functions and duties - those they
actually performed - in determining whether they are ministers.
3. HOW DOES THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AFFECT
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION?
Given that the terms church and minister encompass numerous employment relationships, religious institutions of higher education may

find in the ministerial exception a limited protection from liability. Not
every religious college or university, however, will qualify. Institutions
with close doctrinal and financial ties to a church or other clearly reli-

gious organization, with behavior and conduct expectations consistent
with the belief of that church or organization and with religious studies
integrated into the educational experience more likely fall within the

definitions required for the exception to apply. In particular, courts generally consider religious colleges and universities offering secular
courses and degrees less deserving of exception under this standard than
seminaries, schools of divinity, bible schools, and elementary and secondary parochial or sectarian schools. 220 The latter evoke the inference,

whether or not deserved, of being more pervasively religious and more
like a church in the formal sense.

Examples of this phenomenon are few, but the relevant cases
clearly establish the pattern. A pervasively religious, sectarian liberal
217. See S. W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283 ("In this case, the faculty are intermediaries between the
[Southern Baptist] Convention and the future ministers of many local Baptist churches."); EEOC v.
Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding the ministerial exception inapplicable in part
because "[tihe faculty members are not intermediaries between a church and its congregation").
218. See Alicea-Hemandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003) (involving a position akin to "press secretary" for the Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago); Roman
Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 805 (finding this principle no less applicable to a music minister than
any other type of minister simply because "the voice that speaks is the voice of song"); Minker v.
BaIt. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("[D]etermination of whose voice speaks for the church is per se a religious matter.").
219. See, e.g., Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 1994);
PacificPress, 676 F.2d at 1277; S. W Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284.
220. See SANDIN, supra note 6, at 248; Lupu, supra note 184, at 430, n. 137.
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arts college was held not to be a church, though owned and operated by a
religious denomination, in EEOC v. Mississippi College221 However, in
EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary,222 the court concluded that a seminary, owned by a related denomination, was a
church.223 Likewise, EEOC v. Catholic University of America,224 established the same for the ecclesiastical departments of the District of Columbia's Catholic University, which are significantly under the control
of the Vatican. 5 Finally, in a more recent case, Hartwig v. Albertus
Magnus College,22 6 the court held that Albertus Magnus College, a liberal arts college in New Haven, Connecticut, was "closely affiliated with
the Roman Catholic Church" and, thus, qualified for the exception.22 7
Not every employee of a religious institution of higher education
that passes the "church" inquiry qualifies as a minister. The employee
must be performing a suitable ministerial function. Probably the easiest
application of the ministerial exception involves the campus minister or
chaplain, whose main role is to be the ecclesiastical intermediary between the school community and the church.228 For teaching faculty
members, however, this ministerial function requirement means that the
faculty member must be engaged in "instruct[ing] students in the whole
of religious doctrine., 229 Therefore, seminary professorships, like those
involved in Southwestern Baptist,230 and other religious education positions, like the canon law position in Catholic University,23' are particu221. 626 F.2d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). But see EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding the ministerial exception applicable to Catholic University, an indisputably sectarian institution, like Mississippi College). Nevertheless, Catholic University, like Mississippi College, offers many courses of study in addition to religion. The difference in treatment between these two cases certainly reflects the function performed by the particular employees at issue
rather than the character of the institution itself. See infra text accompanying note 229.
222. 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
223. Id. at 283.
224. 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
225. Id. at 464.
226. 93 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Conn. 2000).
227. Id.at211.
228. See Schmoll v. Chapman Univ., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1434, 1436 (1999) (holding that the
ministerial exception applied to campus minister's claims of constructive discharge and sex discrimination pursuant to California's Fair Employment and Housing Act); S. W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at
284-85.
229. EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 1980); see also EEOC v. Catholic Univ.
of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that the stated mission of ministers within the
ecclesiastical faculty of Catholic University "is to foster and teach sacred doctrine and the disciplines related to it") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); EEOC v. S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981).
230. S.W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283.
231. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 465.
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larly suited for treatment as ministerial positions. By contrast, professors
who teach traditionally secular, non-religious subjects at religious institutions of higher education fall outside the "minister" definition. This
holds true even if they are expected, by contractual obligation or otherwise, to model exemplary moral and religious personal and professional
lives. 232 Such an ancillary religious function is insufficient, by itself, to
render the position ministerial. Nevertheless, a court will consider a lifestyle expectation along with other factors to determine the ministerial
function of the position.233
Other teaching positions are arguably covered by the exception, but
as of yet no court has definitively decided a case involving such positions. Most notably among these are religion professors at sectarian institutions. For instance, the court in Hartwig refused to determine as a matter of law whether Hartwig, a former priest who taught in the
Department of Religious Studies and Philosophy at Albertus Magnus
College, held a ministerial position.234 The court stated that it required
additional evidence regarding "his actual teaching and non-teaching
functions," including whether "he taught Roman Catholic theology,
canon law, or similar courses" and whether he "led students in prayer or
provided them with spiritual counseling. 2 35 In the end, these positions
seem to fall somewhere between the seminary professors at issue in
Southwest Baptist and the educational psychology professor at issue in
Mississippi College, and require a fact-intensive analysis, much as
Hartwig indicated.
Non-teaching positions are likewise evaluated by function. Support
staff, clerical workers, and administrators involved with non-academic,
non-religious departments are not ministers. 6 Such employees perform
no religious function and, therefore, the institution receives no constitutional protection from Title VII for decisions involving those employees.
Academic administrators and other employees with religious responsibilities, however, may fall within the ministerial exception. The Southwestern Baptist court found just that with regard to "[t]he President and
Executive Vice President of the Seminary, the chaplain, the deans of
232. See Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 485 ("That faculty members are expected to serve as exemplars of practicing Christians does not serve to make the terms and conditions of their employment
matters of church administration and thus purely of ecclesiastical concern.").
233. See supra notes 214-219 and accompanying text. See also S.W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283
(noting that the faculty at the seminary is required to teach by example, but that the modeling expectation alone would not be controlling) (internal citations omitted).
234. Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 211-12 (D. Conn. 2000).
235. Id.
236. See S. W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 285.
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men and women, the academic deans and those other personnel who
equate to or supervise faculty" at the seminary. 3 7
In sum, the ministerial exception does cover certain religiouslyoriented positions at institutions with strong ties to their sponsoring
church or denomination. For those few positions that the exception covers, its impact is significant. The institution may make decisions regarding hiring and firing, as well as terms and conditions of employment,
based on the race, sex, and national origin, 8 as well as religion, of the
employee. 239 Because the ministerial exception is a blanket exception to
Title VII, courts will not probe the reason for an employment decision.
Furthermore, the ministerial exception has been applied to exempt an institution, for those qualifying positions, from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reporting requirements. 240 Taking all of this into account, the exception provides an institution with significant autonomy in
filling and administering the covered positions, as wellas freedom from
potentially burdensome government regulation.
B. The Continuing Validity of the MinisterialException
Commentators have pounced on the -ministerial exception. Some
criticize the McClure court for employing sloppy constitutional analysis. 24 1 Others offer alternative constructions of how a legitimate ministerial exception should work.24 2 Still others denounce the exception as unconstitutional and inequitable.243 While the Supreme Court has never
24
directly addressed the validity of the ministerial exception, 244 relatively
237. Id. at 284-85.
238. Religious institutions of higher education have no reason to discriminate on any basis
other than religion if their goal is to protect their religious nature, which in turn preserves institutional diversity. Therefore, the ministerial exception merely provides a broad grant of discretion to
these institutions in that regard The ministerial exception, as it relates to the subject of this paper,
only protects those decisions that, while based on religion, also correlate with another protected
category (e.g., no women priests).
239. See contra 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l-2000e-2(e)(2) (2000) (exempting only decisions based
on religion); see supra Part Ii.A.3.a.
240. See S. W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 287.
241. See, e.g., Brant, supra note 120, at 292-94; Lupu, supranote 184, at 396-97.
242. See, e.g., Bagni, supra note 184; Laycock, supra note 184; Lupu, supra note 184; Kohler,
supra note 184.
243. Rutherford, supra note 184 at 1067.
244. The Supreme Court refused to review cases in which the ministerial exception was unambiguously presented. See Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 513 U.S. 929
Conf of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th
(1994) (denying certiorari to Young v. N. i11.
Cir. 1994)); S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary v. EEOC, 456 U.S. 905 (1982) (denying certiorari
to EEOC v. S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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recent developments in Supreme Court reasoning both under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause for a time raised legitimate
questions regarding the continuing validity of the ministerial exception.
As discussed below, however, the lower federal courts have largely rebuffed these concerns and the ministerial exception seems fairly unassailable for the time being.
Establishment Clause concerns have traditionally been of secondary
importance to the free exercise concerns when defining the ministerial
exception.245 Nonetheless, establishment concerns have influenced the
scope of the exception from its inception.24 6 The specific concern under
the Establishment Clause is that the government will "involve itself too
deeply in [a religious organization's] affairs ' 247 and become entangled in
the church's role of defining acceptable religious beliefs and practices.
Such entanglement concerns stem from the three-prong Establishment
Clause inquiry announced by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurzman,248 which prohibits an "excessive government entanglement with
religion. ' 249 The Court, in Lemon, explained that the determination of
whether there is excessive entanglement is determined by three factors:
the character and purpose of the institution affected, the nature of the aid
to or burden upon the religious organization's affairs, and the resulting
relationship between the state and the religious organization. 25 0 This in245. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972) (focusing primarily on free exercise concerns); Bagni, supra note 184, at 1544.
246. See e.g., McClure, 460 F.2d at 558 (questioning whether "the provisions of Title VI1...
violate eitherof the [r]eligion [c]lauses of the First Amendment") (emphasis added).
247. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989).
248. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
249. Id. The three prong analysis is used to determine whether a specific government action
violates the Establishment Clause. To pass constitutional muster, the action must: (1) have a secular
legislative purpose; (2) have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and, (3) not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Id.
250. Id. at 615. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the Establishment Clause would be violated if the court were to look into allegation of sex discrimination
leveled against the Catholic University of America by a female canon law professor who had been
denied tenure. The court found entanglement problems in the following four distinct aspects of the
case:
1. The evaluation of the quality of the professor's writing and teaching by her colleagues
involved whether her scholarship was in accord with church teaching. For the court to
question or probe this inquiry would have impermissibly entangled it in a religious decision.
2. The Committee on Appointments and Promotion, a representative body of faculty university-wide, made its decision based in part on the lack of recommendation from the
priests in the canon law department. For the court to suggest that this procedure was illegitimate would again entangle it in the religious affairs of the department.
3. Any inquiry into whether the university's proffered explanation of nondiscriminatory
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quiry has guided courts in deciding whether the ministerial exception
should apply and to what extent.25'
The entanglement inquiry has repeatedly come under attack, especially in the last decade. Most notably, it is unclear whether entanglement by itself is enough to violate the Establishment Clause.252 The Supreme Court, for its part, has shown growing dissatisfaction with the
Lemon test 253 and appears less and less tied to it as a doctrinal structure.254 In fact, the entanglement inquiry may not even exist any longer
as a distinct prong of the Establishment Clause analysis, but instead as
an element of the primary effect inquiry.255
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has come to rely more and more
on the endorsement inquiry; first espoused by Justice O'Connor in Lynch
v. Donnelly.25 6 It focuses on whether a reasonable observer, who is
aware of the history and context of the situation, would perceive the
government to have endorsed or disapproved of religion.2 57 While Justice O'Connor equates her endorsement test with the primary effect
reasons for the denial of tenure was pretext for discrimination and would have required
the court to assign and weigh credibility among witnesses offering religious views.
4. Allowing the EEOC's investigation to proceed to fruition would have lead future tenure decisions to be made with a mind toward avoiding litigation rather than selecting the
best person for the position. This would impermissibly allow a government agency to influence considerations by a religious organization.
See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 465-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See also Theresa J.
Fuentes, Note, Title VII, Religious Freedom, and the Case of the Nontenured Nun, 65 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 743, 747 (1997).
251. See, e.g., Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 465; Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian
Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 361-62 (8th Cir. 1991); EEOC v. S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651
F.2d 277, 286 (5th Cir. 1981).
252. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 674 (1980). Cf S.W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 285 n.5 (noting that the
entanglement claim presents an uncomfortable fit under either of the two First Amendment religion
clauses and such claims may at some point necessitate a new test). "
253. Chief among the critics of Lemon and the entanglement inquiry is Justice Scalia, who has
likened it to a horror show monster that must be repeatedly killed. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
254. For example, the majority opinion in the Court's most recent Establishment Clause case,
Zelman v. Simon-Harris,never cites Lemon. See Zelman v. Simon-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
255. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218, 232-33 (1997). See also Zelman, 536 U.S. at
668-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In Agostini v. Felton, we folded the entanglement inquiry into
the primary effect inquiry. This made sense because both inquiries rely on the same evidence, and
the degree of entanglement has implications for whether a statute advances or inhibits religion.")
(internal citations omitted).
256. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
257. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655; Id. at 669
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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prong of Lemon, 258 which in turn seems to have engulfed the entanglement inquiry, 259 that does little to clarify the fate of a judicially-created
doctrine that is based on entanglement concerns standing alone, as the
ministerial exception seems to be. 260 Nevertheless, some courts continue
to analyze ministerial exception cases under the rubric of excessive entanglement, with little or no consideration of these issues.2 61 Other
courts, however, have recognized a shift in the Establishment Clause jurisprudence and have limited the protection that it provides to religious
institutions under the entanglement inquiry.26 2
To a greater degree than Establishment Clause considerations, free
exercise concerns illuminate much of the territory staked out by the ministerial exception. The ministerial exception was developed under the
"compelling interest" test as explicated in Wisconsin v. Yoder263 and
Sherbert v. Verner.264 That test required a government action that imposed a limit on the free exercise of religion to be based on a compelling
government interest and to be narrowly tailored to meet that interest.265
The compelling interest test, however, was repudiated in the landmark
case of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Ore258. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
259. Id. at 668-69.
260. In fact, wholesale adoption of the endorsement analysis could turn the tables on the ministerial exception. Under an endorsement test, the ministerial exception itself is arguably a violation of
the Establishment Clause. See Eikenberry, supra note 184, at 284-85 (making a similar argument).
In all likelihood, a challenge based on this contention would look much like the challenge to Title
Vil's section 702(a) exemption in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 349 (1987). See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of this case. Applying her endorsement analysis there, Justice
O'Connor clearly agreed with the majority in upholding section 702(a), stating that the reasonable
observer should perceive the legislative enactment as an accommodation rather than an endorsement
of religion. Id. at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
261. See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (1 lth
Cir. 2000); Bollard v. Cal. Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that
alternative analytical frameworks to the Lemon test have been advocated, but noting that "the Court
has not yet reached consensus on Lemon's successor," and opting therefore to analyze the case under the entanglement inquiry); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Schmoll v. Chapman Univ., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1434, 1440-42 (1999).
262. See, e.g., Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 212-15 (D. Conn. 2000)
(applying the entanglement analysis to a common law claim, albeit in a way that is less protective of
the religious institution's autonomy); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 715-19 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (finding that a limited inquiry into
the conduct and supervisory structure of the church for purposes of a sexual harassment claim by a
lay employee of a church would not result in excessive entanglement and recognizing the postAgostini conflation of entanglement and effect).
263. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
264. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
265. Id. at 402-03.
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gon v. Smith. 266 Justice Scalia, speaking for the court, wrote "the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes). ' '267 Therefore, no exception from such a law is compelled on
free exercise grounds. Justice Scalia avoided directly overturning the
compelling interest test by explaining that the cases in which the test
previously applied involved conjunctions of free exercise and some other
constitutional protection. 268 He referred to such claims as "hybrid situations. ,,269 Claims oof that type would presumably still require analysis unn
der the compelling interest test.
The ministerial exception was thought to be required by compelling
interest analysis. The Smith decision, therefore, undermines the free exercise basis for the exception. Title VII, though not a criminal law like
the one at issue in Smith,27 ° is almost certainly a neutral law of general
applicability.271 Thus, no exception is required unless the Smith rule is
somehow inapplicable to the ministerial exception.2 72
Three arguments, though admittedly not conclusive, can be advanced for why this interplay between the ministerial exception and the
Smith rule may actually be the case. First, the ministerial exception in its
original form was not a constitutional doctrine at all. Rather, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in McClure v. Salvation Army 273 held that Congress never intended Title VII to apply to the relationship between a
church and its ministers.274 The lack of specificity of the statutory text
266. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
267. Id. at 879 (internal quotes and citation omitted).
268. Id. at 881-82.
269. Id. at 882.
270. At least one commentator seized on the fact that Smith dealt specifically with a criminal
law, suggesting that the case might not apply in the civil context. See Mary Ann Glendon, Law,
Communities, and the Religious Freedom Language of the Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

672, 683-84 (1992).
271. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 809 (N.D. Cal.
1992); Brant, supra note 120, at 308-09 ("While the identifying characteristics of a 'neutral and
generally applicable' law remain uncertain, federal anti-discrimination laws like Title VII are likely
to qualify under any of the proposed standards.").
272. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") purported to restore the compelling interest test despite Smith. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et. seq. (2000). However, the Supreme Court
declared the RFRA unconstitutional as it applies to state law. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 536 (1997). Consequently, the RFRA may not provide a safe haven for the ministerial exception from federal law either, as one court found. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,
467-68 (1996).
273. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
274. Id. at 560-61.
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supported this notion. 275 The exception was originally grounded in statutory interpretation. Smith, it is argued, is inapplicable because it deals
solely with constitutional exemptions. 76 The new development in Smith

does not change the original intention of the Congress that passed Title
VII. 27 7

But this argument is disingenuous at best. The McClure court relied heavily on compelling interest analysis under the Free Exercise

Clause to reach the conclusion that either Title VII was unconstitutional
as applied to the Salvation Army or that the relationship between
McClure and the Salvation Army was not covered by Title VII. 278 The

court then used a canon of statutory construction in order to avoid the
constitutional question.2 79 Subsequent cases considering the ministerial

exception have never referred to the exception in anything other than
constitutional terms.280 The assertion that the ministerial exception is
based on statutory interpretation cannot shield it from scrutiny under
Smith. Ultimately, the inquiry comes down to whether or not the exception is constitutionally compelled even if it is based on statutory interpretation.
A second argument that the ministerial exception survives Smith,

depends on distinguishing between the individuals who were at issue in
Smith and the institutions or organizations that are at issue under the
ministerial exception. 281 This argument depends on reading Smith as

only standing for the notion that an individual should not be excused
from complying with neutral laws of general applicability. If so, "[i]t
does not follow ...that Smith stands for the proposition that a church
may never be relieved from such an obligation., 282 Every court that has
directly addressed this issue since Smith has relied on this notion. 283 This
conclusion is based on two grounds. First, the ministerial exception is

275. See id. at 560.
276. See Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462.
277. See id.
278. McClure, 466 F.2d at 558-61.
279. Id. at 560.
280. See, e.g., Alicea-Hemandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 702-03 (7th Cir.
2003); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655-59 (10th Cir. 2002);
EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington v. Christian
Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (1 lthCir. 2000); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 345-46, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1999); Catholic
Univ., 83 F.3d at 460; Young v. N. 11).Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187
(7th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
281. Roman CatholicDiocese, 213 F.3d at 800.
282. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462.
283. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 800 (citing Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1302-04;
Combs, 173 F.3d at 347-50; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 461-63).
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fundamentally different from the type of exception that was sought by
the Smith plaintiffs, primarily because it was sought by the organization
rather than an individual. 8 4 In essence, the difference that the concern in
Smith was that if the compelling interest test is applied in cases where an
individual's religious beliefs are at issue, then the individual's legal obligations would depend entirely on his religious beliefs and allow him
"to become a law unto himself."285 That concern simply does not exist in
the context of the ministerial exception, especially on the individual
level with which the Smith court seemed so concerned. Second, the ministerial exception never relied on compelling interest analysis; instead,
"all of [the ministerial exception cases] rely on a long line of Supreme
Court cases that affirm the fundamental right of churches to decide for
matters of church government
themselves, free from state interference,
286
as well as those of faith and doctrine.
Finally, even if Smith does apply to Title VII as a neutral law of
general applicability and the free exercise issues involved with the
ministerial exception cannot be distinguished from Smith, ministerial
exception cases may qualify as "hybrid situations." The opinion in Smith
distinguished cases presenting hybrid situations where the court is
presented with more than one constitutional claim. The court in Catholic
University found that this built-in exception to Smith was enough to save
the ministerial exception.287 Because it is almost always premised on
both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns, the ministerial
exception uniformly presents a sort of hybrid claim; however, the hybrid
288
situations to which Justice Scalia referred were somewhat different.
Those presented two distinct constitutional claims, like free speech2 89 or

284. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 800; Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303-04; Combs, 173
F.3d at 349; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462 (noting that the dangers warned of in Smith are not
threatened by the ministerial exception).
285. Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303-04 (quoting Employment Div. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 885 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462-63 ("[Wle cannot believe that the Supreme Court in Smith
intended to qualify this century-old affirmation of a church's sovereignty over its own affairs.")
(quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)). See
supra notes 199 and 261 and accompanying text discussing the reliance on this line of cases and
authority suggesting that perhaps the reliance is misguided.
287. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 467. Interestingly, the subsequent cases that cited favorably the
reasoning in Catholic University, such as Roman Catholic Diocese, Gellington, and Combs, make
no mention of this point.
288. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
289. See Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 108 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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the right of parents to direct the education of their children, 290 along with
free exercise. Especially considering the overlap of issues between entanglement analysis and free exercise analysis, it would be surprising if
the Supreme Court treated the ministerial exception as presenting such a
hybrid situation.29 '
Despite these nagging uncertainties about the constitutional underpinnings of the ministerial exception, courts have continued to treat it as
an important safeguard for religious institutions to make important employment decisions free from governmental interference. For now, the
ministerial exception appears to be an entrenched constitutional doctrine.
Most religious institutions of higher education have several positions that are indisputably ministerial. Those positions are often filled by
the people the institution looks to for religious leadership, guidance, and
decision-making. Therefore, the ministerial exception not only protects
important religious liberties, it also provides religious institutions of
higher education the authority to insist that the individuals who fill those
important positions are committed to the religious mission and to do so
free from any governmental interference or inquiry into those decisions.
Accordingly, the ministerial exception can be seen as a most important
tool in maintaining inter-institutional diversity as it relates to religious
institutions.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Having addressed the easier, though not necessarily clearer, issues
of whether, under what circumstances, and upon what bases a religious
institution of higher education may discriminate when making employment decisions, it is important to focus on the more difficult normative
question of whether an institution should use that ability to preserve its
institutional identity and enrich the diversity of higher education. Such
an undertaking is difficult in that so many considerations influence that
decision. The exemptions and the constitutional protections outlined
above do not specifically address the unique situation of religious higher
education. Instead, they focus on the entire enterprise of religiously affiliated or motivated education, from pre-school to graduate studies. This
normative question, however, must be addressed by focusing on the
unique aspects of higher education. Two concerns of that sort are vitally

290. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
291. See Brant, supra note 120, at 311-15 (discussing how a religious institution is unlikely to
present a cognizable hybrid situation).
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important in forming any policy regarding the use of religious preferences: the trend toward secularization among religious institutions of
higher education and the value of academic freedom. These two considerations are often in conflict and the latter is sometimes identified as one
of the causes of the former.292 Still, a religious institution of higher education must take account of both in order to make an informed judgment
on the necessity or propriety of using discrimination to preserve its religious character.
A. Secularization
Starting with the advent of publicly supported higher education,
there has been a slow but undeniable shift in the make-up of the postsecondary education system in the United States. Whereas privately-run,
religious educational institutions once offered the only post-secondary
2 93
education in the United States, they are now the exception to the rule.
In fact, independent and nonpublic higher education has been declining
on all fronts, not just religious. Between 1970 and 1982, 167 independent institutions of higher education closed, sixty-seven of which were religious. 294 Nevertheless, the more subtle, but ultimately more troublesome, trend is that of the increasing pressure on religious institutions of
higher education to give up their unique religious approach and heritage.
This is the trend toward secularization. It is spurred by competition with
nonreligious institutions for influential intellectuals to fill the faculty, in
order to attract more students from among a finite population.
The secularization trend was foreshadowed by developments
throughout the early part of the twentieth century in the elite academic
institutions. George M. Marsden offers an exhaustive account of this
story in his book, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY. In it, he
explains how religion, which had been the guiding force for institutions
like Harvard University, Yale University, and other elite institutions, lost
its place in the direction and even the discourse of these institutions. Finally, during the 1960's the last vestiges of religious orientation were
shed and these institutions became completely secular. 95 The institutions, which had been affiliated with the mainline Protestant denominations, turned their backs on their religious heritage. This, however, does
292. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 4, at 73.
293. Bramhall & Ahrens, supra note 4, at 230 n.Il (collecting examples of scholarly study of
the secularization trend).
294. Mawdsley, supranote 5, at 1094-95 n.7.
295. See MARSDEN, supra note 4, at 433, 439.
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not explain why such a development is worthy of note. Harvard and Yale
continue to be among the most prestigious post-secondary institutions in
the world. Some argue this is not in spite of severing their religious affiliations, but because of it. 296 Many people believe that religion cannot

be the unifying force in the intellectual pursuit of the modem university. 297 Therefore, why should an institution care about secularization?
There are definite losses when a formerly religious institution of
higher education sacrifices that religious identity. First, related to the defining idea of this article, diversity and institutional variety suffers. Second, there is a psychological loss to the individuals committed to its
preservation and to the community with which the institution had been
affiliated.2 98 Still, neither of these is a direct attack on religious liberty. If
the institution makes a considered internal choice to forego any religious
affiliation, then the losses suffered may be widely felt, but are not of
tremendous societal concern. 299 Unfortunately, not all such shifts are
based on a freely-made institutional choice, but rather result from outside pressures. In fact, the current trend toward secularization is marked
less by considered institutional choice than by "secularization-bydefault."300
The external pressures that lead religious institutions of higher education to continue chipping away at their religious foundation can be
segregated into two types. The first type of pressure is reputational. This
phenomenon is neither as sinister nor as devastating as the second. Although its genesis is an outside pressure, the ultimate choice is internal.
Religious institutions of higher education, no different from their secular
counterparts, feel pressure to attract outstanding faculty. Students, academics, and society in general judge an educational institution at least in
part by its faculty members and their accomplishments. Therefore, institutions vie for the most academically-gifted faculty members. A good
school requires a good faculty. Refusing to consider all but a small number of possible candidates for a faculty position can severely limit an institution's ability to attract top scholars.3 °1 Yet, this is exactly what religious institutions of higher education do when they use preferential

296. See SANDIN, supra note 6, at 260.
297. A committee at Harvard University took just this view in 1945 in its report on "General
Education in a Free Society." See SANDIN, supra note 6, at 260.
298. Douglas Laycock, Academic Freedom, Religious Commitment, and Religious Integrity, 78
MARQ. L. REV.297, 305 (1995).
299. See id.
300. Araujo, supra note 18, at 716.
301. Id. at 719.
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hiring criteria based on religion. Because the orientation and mission of
the school are largely governed by the desires and character of the faculty, 30 2 religious institutions of higher education are often forced into a
tough decision between attracting outstanding faculty and maintaining
their religious mission. The trend toward secularization occurs with the
decision to go with the outstanding faculty, even if they do not share a
commitment to the religious mission of the institution.
The second external pressure comes in the form of the accreditation
process. The infringement on religious liberty in this instance is more
pronounced. Accreditation organizations are often relied on by governments to determine the suitability of a particular degree, especially in the
professional studies. 30 3 Because of this power, an accreditation organization can exert pressure on an institution to conform to the organization's
ideal of the proper make-up of a faculty, student body, and curriculum. 30 4 Often, these institutions are criticized for not being diverse
enough.30 5 In effect, the accreditation process prizes conformity on the
institutional level to promote diversity on the faculty level. This exercise
has been referred to as "academic homogeneity promoted in the name of
30 6
diversity.
Some accreditation organizations have been reluctant to accredit institutions that cling to their religious ideals and take steps to preserve
their religious nature. A striking recent example of this phenomenon involves Patrick Henry College in Virginia, which sought accreditation by
the American Academy for Liberal Education ("AALE"). Initially,
AALE denied Patrick Henry College's application for preaccreditation
for alleged noncompliance with AALE's Mission Standard Five, 307 regarding free thought and free speech, and General Education and Cur-

302. Id.
303. For example, many state judiciaries delegate authority to the American Bar Association
("ABA") accreditation process and only allow graduates from ABA accredited institutions to sit for
the state's bar exam. See Princeton Review, What You Should Know about Law School Accredita-

tion, at http://www.princetonreview.com/law/research/articles/find/accreditation.asp
Sept. 23, 2004).

(last visited

304. See Douglas Laycock, The Rights of Religious Academic Communities, 20 J.C. & U.L. 15,
25 (1993).
305. See MARSDEN, supra note 4, at 436.

306. Id. at 437.
307. Mission Standard Five states: "Liberty of thought and freedom of speech are supported
and protected, bound only by such rules of civility and order as to facilitate intellectual inquiry and
the search for truth." AMER. ACAD. FOR LIBERAL EDUC.,
INSTITUTIONAL
ACCREDITATION
&
PREACCREDITATION
http://www.aale.org/edstand.htm.
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riculum Standard Eight,3 °8 regarding basic knowledge in the biological
sciences. Both are standards of the AALE's Standards and Criteria for
Institutional Accreditation and Preaccreditation. °9 Of concern to the
AALE was Patrick Henry College's Statement of Biblical Worldview,
with which all Patrick Henry College faculty members must comply. In
particular, the Statement of Biblical Worldview required
[a]ny biology, Bible, or other courses at [Patrick Henry College] dealing with creation will teach creationism from the understanding of
scripture that God's creative work, as described in Genesis 1:1-31, was
completed in six twenty-four hour days. All faculty for such courses
will be chosen on the basis of their personal adherence to this view.
[Patrick Henry College] does not intend to limit biblically-based dis"theistic" or
cussion of this issue; provided, however, that evolution,
3 10
otherwise, will not be treated as an acceptable theory.
This requirement troubled AALE through its apparent limitation on
acceptable thought and speech (i.e., academic freedom concerns), 31 ' and
because it appeared purposely to keep students in the dark regarding
widely accepted scientific theory about the origin of life (i.e., liberal
education and basic knowledge concerns).3 12
Patrick Henry College viewed AALE's denial of preaccreditation as
"blatant viewpoint discrimination" and as an affront to the college's
freedom of thought and belief.31 3 Michael Farris, President of Patrick
Henry College, touched on the very issue underlying this article (albeit
intemperately) in criticizing AALE's denial: "One would think that hav308. General Education and Curriculum Standard Eight reads as follows:
The general education requirement ensures a basic knowledge of mathematics and the
physical and biological sciences, including laboratory experience, intermediate knowledge of at least one foreign language, the study of literature and literary classics, the political, philosophical, and cultural history of Westem Civilization, and the foundations
and principles of American society. Variations from this norm are allowable in cases
where the outstanding character of other elements of the general education program assures substantial compliance with these standards.
Id. at 9.
309. See Letter from Jeffrey Wellin, President of AALE, to Michael Farris, President of Patrick
Henry College (April 30, 2002), availableat http://www.phc.edu/news/dos/200205103.pdf (copy on
file with the author).
310. Id.
311. See infra Part IV.B. for a discussion of academic freedom concerns as they relate to religious institutions of higher education.
312. See Letter from Jeffrey Wellin to Michael Farris, supra note 310.
313. Patrick Henry College, Patrick Henry College Denied Accreditation for Creationist
(May
9,
2002),
at
Will
Appeal
Discriminatory Ruling,
Views:
College
http://www.phc.edu/news/docs/200205 I 00.asp.
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ing diverse views among colleges would somehow fit into an age that
worships at the 'temple of diversity' but true diversity is not tolerated. 3 14 The Statement of Biblical Worldview is clearly part of Patrick
Henry College's attempt to insure that the religious mission upon which
it is founded is respected and preserved. In part, this is accomplished by
allowing only professors who share the same religiously-informed beliefs regarding the origin of life (or at least who will support that belief
by teaching it as true) to teach in biology and religion classes. This is the
very freedom that the Title VII exemptions were implemented to protect.
Patrick Henry College appealed AALE's decision.31 5 The appeal resulted in a compromise of sorts. Patrick Henry College explained and
eventually altered its Statement of Biblical Worldview to reflect that it
did not prohibit teaching or discussion of evolution, but only that it expected faculty to treat creationism as true. 316 AALE acceded, sustaining
the appeal on the liberal education and general knowledge grounds and
remanding the decision to AALE's Board of Trustees. 317 The Appeals
Committee found no substantial evidence to support the Board's initial
determination that Patrick Henry College violated General Education
and Curriculum Standard Eight. 3 8 At the time of the denial, no biology
courses had yet been taught at Patrick Henry College. 3 19 As a result, the
Appeals Committee could not credit the Board's speculative concern that
students might not be fully informed regarding the biological sciences.

314. Id.
315. See Notice of Intent to Appeal from Michael Ferris, President of Patrick Henry College, to
AALE (May 8, 2002), availableat http://www.phc.edu/news/docs/200205102.pdf.
316. See Patrick Henry College, Patrick Henry College Statement of Biblical Worldview
(adopted Sept. 28, 2002), available at http://www.phc.edu/docs/StatementofBiblicalWorldview.asp.
The revised portion dealing with "Creation" reads as follows:
Any biology, Bible or other courses at [Patrick Henry College] dealing with creation will
teach creation from the understanding of Scripture that God's creative work, as described
in Genesis 1:1-31, was completed in six twenty-four hour days. All faculty for such
courses will be chosen on the basis of their personal adherence to this view. [Patrick
Henry College] expects itsfaculty in these courses, as in all courses, to expose students
to alternate theories and the data, if any, which support those theories. In this context,

[PatrickHenry College] in particularexpects its biology faculty to provide a full exposition of the claims of the theory of Darwinian evolution, intelligent design and other major theories while, in the end, teach creation as both biblically true and as the best fit to
observed data.
Id. (emphasis added to highlight revised portion).
317. See Decision of AALE Appeals Committee, Appeal of Patrick Henry College (Aug.16,
2002), availableat http://www.phc.edu/news/docs/200208161 -I .pdf.
318. Id. at4-5.
319. Id. at 5.
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The proof would be in the actual teaching of the class, not in generalized
concerns about the Statement of Biblical Worldview.
The Appeals Committee, however, found sufficient evidence in the
Statement of Biblical Worldview to sustain the AALE Board's original
decision that Patrick Henry College failed to comply with Mission Standard Five's requirement of free thought and speech, the academic freedom concerns. 32 0 Nevertheless, the Appeals Committee remanded the
decision to the Board on the basis that the Denial Letter appeared to be
premised on the violation of both Standard Five and Standard Eight. 21I A
violation of only a single standard, in the Appeals Committee's judgment, might have resulted in a different decision on the preaccreditation
application.322
True to the Appeals Committee's prediction, several months later following the revision to the Statement of Biblical Worldview - AALE
granted preaccreditation to Patrick Henry College.323 On the whole,
however, that determination resolved little of the underlying distrust, if
not hostility, that AALE and its standards manifest toward pervasively
religious (especially fundamentalist) institutions.324 The two parties
ended up talking past each other, presumably in an attempt to save
face.325 While the compromise position that was ultimately reached may
320. Id. at 3-4. This is true despite the fact that AALE's Criterion 5.2 of Mission Standard Five
provides that: "Any limitations on freedom of speech related to an institution's affirmation of particular religious principles or beliefs must be clearly specified, published, and appropriately disseminated. It is especially important that such limitations be clearly described in an institution's recruitment and informational materials for students, faculty, and administrative
personnel." AMER. ACAD. FOR LIBERAL EDUC., supra note 307, at 7 (emphasis added); Decision of
AALE Appeals Committee, supra note 317, at 3-4. The Appeals Committee, AALE's Board, and
even Patrick Henry College agreed that, if read too broadly, Criterion 5.2 would swallow the rule of
Mission Standard Five. Therefore, the Appeals Committee determined that "there is some point at
which a religious institution's restrictions on freedom of speech, even if clearly disclosed, may be
too great." Id. at 4. So, despite Patrick Henry College's apparent compliance with Criterion 5.2, the
Appeals Committee found that the Statement of Biblical Worldview provided "an evidentiary basis
for the Board's conclusion that the point had indeed been crossed." Id.
321. Id.at 5.
322. Id.
323. See, e.g., Patrick Henry College, AALE Reverses Decision (Nov. 13, 2002), at
http://www.phc.edu/news/docs/200211130.asp; Megan Rooney, On Appeal, Christian College's
Creationism Stance Passes Muster with Accreditor, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Online Edition) (Nov. 15, 2002), at http://chronicle.com/daily/2002/11/2002111505n.htm (copy on file with
author).
324. See Decision of AALE Appeals Committee, supra note 317, at 4 n.3 ("Although Criterion
5.2 seems to suggest that only religious institutions limit freedom of speech and free inquiry, the
Appeals Committee notes that secular institutions often formally or informally proscribe certain
points of view, especially religious ones.").
325. See Rooney, supra note 323, 8. Jeffrey Wallin, President of AALE, said of the Patrick
Henry College controversy, "This is a great example of accreditation at work ... They didn't meet
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have been the best result, it did little to inspire confidence that accreditation organizations can proceed without pressuring, unwittingly or purposely, religious educational institutions to secularize their policies and
curricula or to undermine (or even to abandon) those policies that arguably most protect the religious mission and character of those institutions. 326
Religious institutions of higher education may see religious preferences in hiring, promotion, and tenure decisions as a way to combat the
secularization trend; however, such institutions cannot do so without
risking adverse consequences., First, reducing the number of people
qualified to fill a faculty position almost certainly results in a reduction
of academic qualifications among the remaining candidates. Second, accreditation organizations have become increasingly hostile to such tactics. Such institutions find themselves in a sort of "damned if they do,
damned if they don't" situation.
B. Academic Freedom
The thrust of academic freedom is that there should be no limitations on thought, scholarship, or the pursuit of truth in the academy of
higher learning. That notion is "a constituent element in the very foundation on which the modem university rests., 327 In fact, academic freedom
is a value so deeply entrenched in the definition of the modem institution
of higher learning that it is widely considered "the most cherished tradition of education....,328 Moreover, many scholars and courts suggest
that it is a liberty interest of constitutional origin. 329 This cherished tradiour academic standards so they changed their policies and submitted evidence of the change." Id. At
the same time, Patrick Henry College officials denied changing their policies, instead restating them
to clarify its position. Michael Farris, president of the college, stated, "Our belief in creationism has
not changed." Id. 10.
326. In part for this reason, Bob Jones University in South Carolina has foregone the accreditation process altogether. See Bob Jones Ill, President's Column, BJU REV. (Spring 2003), available
at http://www.bju.edu/aboutbju/pca/spring03 (last visited Sept. l1, 2003); see also Shawn Zeller,
Bob Jones Versus the 'Unsaved,' 31 NAT'L J. 1312 (2003) (noting that students at Bob Jones are
ineligible for federal financial assistance as a result of the lack of accreditation).
327. Lonnie D. Kliever, Academic Freedom and Church-Affiliated Universities, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 1477, 1479 (1988).
328. SANDIN, supra note 6, at 254. But see Bamhall & Ahrens, supra note 4, at 231 ("History
demonstrates that academic freedom has not been an essential element in an institution's efforts to
claim university status.").
329. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the
Supreme Court of the United States: An UnhurriedHistoricalReview, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

79, 80 (1990). See also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Omosegbon v.
Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Academic freedom rights are rooted in the First Amend-
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tion is something that confronts religious institutions of higher education, whereas their elementary and secondary counterparts are not so
constrained. This is because the classical notion of academic freedom
fails (presumably purposefully rather than inadvertently) to include elementary and secondary education. 330 As a result, a religious institution of
higher education must consider the impact that a preferential hiring plan
would have on academic freedom.
Academic freedom clearly has a revered place in American higher
education, but dates back just a half century in its modem form. The
American Association of University Professors ("AAUP") and the Association of American Colleges ("AAC") authored the most influential and
long-standing practical definition of what constitutes academic freedom
in the modem university. In the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940 Statement), the AAUP and the AAC
sought to standardize the definition of academic freedom and prescribe
331
procedural guidelines aimed at protecting the exercise of that freedom.
Declaring that the "common good" of institutions of higher learning
"depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition," the 1940
Statement outlines three instances when the freedom of the teacher to
pursue those goals must be respected: in research and publication; in
teaching
and classroom discussion; and in public speech and expres33 2
sion.
The 1940 Statement has been referred to as the "Bible" and the
"Constitution" of the academic profession. 333 While the 1940 Statement
has no legal effect, it has since been endorsed or adopted by many
learned societies and academic administrative associations.3 34 A series of
interpretive comments were added in 1970 to clear up some ambiguities
and reflect certain changed values.335 Also in 1989 and 1990, the language was changed to remove gender-specific references.336 Other than
these minor adjustments and clarifications, the 1940 Statement has been

Amendment.").
330. SANDIN, supranote 6,at 268.
331.

See AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POL'Y DOCUMENTS AND REP. 3-5 (1984).

332. Id. at 3-4.
333. Ralph S.Brown, Jr. & Matthew W. Finkin, The Usefulness of AA UP Policy Statements,
59 EDUC. REc. 30,35 (1978).
334. See AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POL'Y DOCUMENTS AND REP., supra note 331, at

7-9; Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 53
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4 (1990).
335. See AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POL'Y DOCUMENTS AND REP., supra note 331, at

5.
336. See Metzger, supra note 334, at 407.
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the authoritative document shaping the understanding of, and prescribing
the procedures necessary to protect, academic freedom.
Despite the unifying effect of the 1940 Statement, academic freedom and religious pursuits have never coexisted in friendly company.
The very notion of academic freedom had its genesis in the United States
as a backlash against expectations of religious orthodoxy. Until the midnineteenth century when academic freedom in the modem sense began
evolving, scholarship was judged by its conformity with scriptural truth.
Faculty and administrators at institutions such as Harvard, Yale, and
Princeton questioned this benchmark for judging true scholarship and
began valuing the freedom to pursue truth in what they saw as a more
open intellectual environment. 337 Cognizant of this, but also aware of the
important part religious educational institutions play in religious liberty
as well as the history of American education, the AAUP and the AAC
included the "limitations clause" in the 1940 Statement. It reads: "Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment [of the teacher]."33' 8 Thus, the limitations clause would seemingly
settle any tension between religious commitment and academic freedom
by allowing for religious commitment to trump academic freedom so
long as that policy is stated at the outset.
In practice, the limitations clause has not been a settlement of the
religion/academic freedom tension. In fact, the limitations clause has
been the subject of significant debate and controversy. In 1967, the
AAUP's Special Committee on Academic Freedom in Church Related
Colleges and Universities authored a report and recommendation, which
found that such institutions should not use a religious employment privi339
lege to avoid dealing with issues of diversity and academic freedom.
The recommendation was never formally adopted, but it was the first in
a series of attacks on the limitations clause that has weakened its protection for religious institutions. For example, the 1970 interpretive comments to the 1940 Statement attempt to clarify the limitations clause by
stating that "[m]ost church-related institutions no longer need or desire
the departure from the principle of academic freedom implied in the
1940 Statement, and we do not now endorse such a departure. 3 4 ° How337.
338.

See McConnell, supra note 7, at 306.
AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POL'Y DOCUMENTS AND REP., supra note 331, at 3.

Note how the limitations clause is similar to the AALE's Criterion 5.2 of Mission Standard Five, as
discussed supra in notes 307 and 320 and accompanying text.

339.

SANDIN, supranote 6, at 287.

340.

AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POL'Y DOCUMENTS AND REP., supra note 331, at 5.
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ever, it was unclear whether this comment was meant to repeal the limitations clause or was simply a statement of distaste for its use. 341 Then,
in 1988, a report by AAUP's Committee A on Academic Freedom &
Tenure claimed that all religious institutions are subject to the requirements of the 1940 Statement even if the limitations clause is invoked.342
Committee A's report warned institutions that invoke the limitations
clause that they give up "the moral right to proclaim themselves as authentic seats of higher learning." 343 Moreover, the chairman of the committee thought that the committee's policy repealed the limitations
clause altogether, but the committee members later recanted that interpretation and said that the report simply meant that religious schools
were subject to the 1940 Statement including the limitations clause.344
More recently, however, the AAUP has begun anew the dialog
about the limitations clause through a series of conferences regarding
academic freedom and religion.345 This turn of events suggests a tempering of the intolerance toward the limitations clause.346 It appears, therefore, that the limitations clause is still valid, though at times the AAUP
has done little to hide its contempt for the exception.347
An institution that tries to adhere to both a religious commitment
and a commitment to the value of academic freedom faces a difficult
task. Employment decisions, both hiring and tenure, can have a profound
impact on academic freedom.348 As illustrated by the ideological battles
waged at law schools not all that long ago-especially at Harvard Law
School, over the propriety of critical legal studies and the treatment of
scholars who endorse the philosophy-issues regarding who will be
hired or receive tenure at nonreligious institutions can tear at the intellecof an institution and stir up fears of an
tual and collegial atmosphere
349
academic witch hunt.
341.
342.
343.

See Laycock, supra note 298, at 302.
Id. at 303.
Committee A on Academic Freedom & Tenure, The "Limitations" Clause in the 1940

Statement of Principles,ACADEME Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 55.

344.
345.

McConnell, supra note 7, at 310-11.
See DIEKEMA, supra note 10, at 86.

346.

Martin D. Snyder, Academic Freedom and Religion, ACADEME, May-June 2003, at 103.

347. Cf Bramhall & Ahrens, supra note 4, at 228-29 n.4 (pointing out that nearly one half of
all institutions that the AAUP identified on its censure list were religiously affiliated).
348. See Laycock, supra note 298, at 298-300.
349. See, e.g., ELEANOR KENNLOW, POISONED IVY: How EGOS, IDEOLOGY, AND POWER
POLITICS ALMOST RUINED HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (St. Martin's Press 1994); Phoebe A. Haddon,
Academic Freedom and Governance:A Callfor IncreasedDialogue and Diversity, 66 TEX. L. REV.

1561 (1988) (discussing the divisive environment at Temple University School of Law following
the dismissal of the dean of that law school).
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At religious institutions of higher education, preferential hiring,
promotion, and termination can be attacked not only on the ground that it
is an affront to academic freedom, 350 but also on the basis of discrimination. Faculty distrust of administration and public consternation are often
the inevitable result.351 In fact, religion and religious institutions have
become, in the minds of many, a direct hazard to the ideal of academic
freedom.35 2
No doubt because of the potential pitfalls referenced in the preceding paragraphs, numerous arguments have been presented regarding why
religious institutions should not be held to the modern notion of academic freedom. First, the AAUP's 1940 Statement focuses on only one
aspect of academic freedom, the freedom of the faculty member. The institutional facet of academic freedom is almost completely ignored.35 3
This notion of academic freedom would allow the institution the autonomy to make decisions about its academic mission free from public interference, 354 and should lead to maximum respect for the limitations
clause, as well as preservation of inter-institutional diversity. Also, the
rigid imposition of academic freedom on religious institutions has been a
significant contributing factor in their secularization. Respecting the
limitations clause may help both intellectual advancement, by freeing
scholars to explore a particular strain of thought, and freedom of religion, because that strain of thought is religious.355
Nevertheless, the pressure to afford full academic freedom, even at
religious institutions, remains intense. As evidence of this, the AAUP
was correct when it asserted that many religious and church-related

350. See DIEKEMA, supra note 10, at 29-33 (discussing the controversy at Calvin College surrounding the publication of The Fourth Day, Professor Van Till's exploration of the relationship
between Christian faith and natural science).
351. See id.
352. SANDIN, supranote 6, at 283.
353. Notably, Justice Souter has recognized this facet of academic freedom in a recent concurring opinion he authored. Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("Our understanding of academic freedom has included not merely liberty from restraints on thought, expression, and association in the academy, but also the idea that universities
and schools should have the freedom to make decisions about how and what to teach.").
354. See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REv. 831
(1987).
355. McConnell, supra note 7, at 304 ("To impose the secular norm of academic freedom on
unwilling religious colleges and universities would increase the homogeneity - and decrease the
vitality - of American intellectual life."). But see Bramhall & Ahrens, supra note 4, at 231 (criticizing McConnell's outright rejection of academic freedom and arguing that a "secular paradigm" of
academic freedom can apply, and yet still allow a religiously affiliated university to limit it to preserve its religious character without forfeiting its status in the "legitimate" academic community).
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schools no longer need or desire to invoke the limitations clause.3 56
Chief among these institutions are the national universities associated
with the Catholic Church. 357 In 1967, twenty-six Catholic educators
signed what has become known as "The Land 0' Lakes Statement." 358 It
stated that "[t]o perform its teaching and research functions effectively,
the Catholic university must have a true autonomy and academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to
the academic community itself. '35 9. Catholic institutions have wrestled
publicly with this dual commitment - to religion on the one hand and
academic excellence through academic freedom on the other.360 Some
have done so quite successfully and have raised the standard for other
institutions.3 6'
356. Anthony J. Diekema, former president of Calvin College, which is affiliated with the Reformed tradition of historic Christianity, suggests that religious institutions of higher education may,
in fact, embrace the secular notion of academic freedom. DIEKEMA, supra note 10, at 5; see also
Bramhill & Ahrens, supra note 4, at 231 (making the same claim). Diekema notes, however, that
academic freedom and notions of academic orthodoxy are not necessarily mutually exclusive and
certainly not limited to religious institutions. DIEKEMA, supra note 10, at 12-27; see also The
5, 20, 22 (quoting Anthony Diekema: "There are
Chronicle of Higher Education, supra note 3,
orthodoxies everywhere, of all sorts and shapes, which can, and often do, militate against academic
freedom .... [T]here are many orthodoxies and dominant views within secular higher education
that militate against a religious perspective .... It's interesting to note that because orthodoxies exist everywhere within departments, particularly within divisions of institutions, academic freedom
isn't totally protected anywhere.") (on file with the author); see also Brarnhill & Ahrens, supra note
4, at 239-45 (arguing that there are always limitations on academic freedom imposed by the institutional realities of the academy, by the AAUP's policies (e.g., unprofessional or dishonest speech),
and by Constitutional law); Carter, supra note 5, at 494 ("Academic freedom.., has always been a
cabined freedom .. "); VILLANOVA UNIV., supra note 128, at 3-4 (noting Villanova's commitment
to academic freedom, but also pointing out that "[n]o university ... seeks to represent in its faculty
every perspective. In addition to the primary criterion of competence in one's field, a wide and diverse range of ethical, social, political, cultural and intellectual values, in fact, informs hiring decisions at all universities, without prejudice to academic freedom. Religious values have no less legitimate a claim to inform such selection .... ").
357. Charles E. Curran, Academic Freedom and Catholic Universities, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1441,
1441-42 (1988).
358. Id. at 1442.
359. Id.
360. See generally THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY (Theodore M.
Hesburgh ed., 1994) (presenting a series of essays by faculty at the University of Notre Dame on the
challenges faced by a Catholic university).
361. Villanova University, for instance, is deliberate and methodical when determining the role
hiring decisions that take into account the candidates view on the school's religious mission and
character will play in the preservation of its mission, an initiative it calls "Mission Centered Hiring."
VILLANOVA UNIV., supra note 128, at 2. Villanova's Office for Mission Effectiveness canvassed its
own faculty and consulted other like institutions about the notion of mission centered hiring. See
CHRISTOPHER M. JANOSIK, MISSION CENTERED HIRING FOR FACULTY: Focus GROUP EVALUATION

at
available
1-2
(2001),
RESOURCE
GUIDE
OF
THE
http://www3.villanova.edu/mission/mchiring/mcheval.pdf. In doing so, Villanova has continued to
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A religious institution of higher education cannot engage in preferential hiring without considering the impact on academic freedom. It
should also consider alternative plans that would result in less encroachment on academic freedom. If a religious institution decides to use
a religious test or preference of some sort, it should, at the very least, announce that intention and the reason therefore.362
Not only would that bring the institution into compliance with the
limitations clause, it also would enhance the legitimacy of the decision.
Otherwise, applicants may be surprised by a religiously-motivated hiring
decision and may bring claims based on Title VII or other civil rights
laws. Also, a tenure candidate who was hired and then subsequently refused tenure for religious reasons could feel trapped and coerced.363 The
institution has nothing invested in such an ambush and should avoid it,
premised on professional courtesy, public relations, and legal pragmatism.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the strong policy against discrimination in employment,
Congress and the courts have defined several limited exemptions from
Title VII for religious organizations, including religious institutions of
higher education.36 4 The exemptions protect and promote religious liberty. This article suggests that those exemptions, as they relate to discrimination on religious grounds, should be interpreted broadly to guarantee institutions the greatest amount of religious liberty.
Once given that freedom to discriminate, religious institutions of
higher education must decide whether to use it. However, answering the
question of whether an institution may discriminate does not answer the
ultimate question of whether it should do so. This article has pinpointed
and explained a value that legitimizes the use of discrimination by those
schools in limited circumstances: maintaining institutional diversity in
maintain academic freedom as a defining norm of its mission. See VILLANOVA UNIV., supra note
128, at 3.
362. For a related discussion of these issues in terms of faculty who are required to sign faith
statements, see generally Beth McMurtrie, Do Professors Lose Academic Freedom by Signing
Statements of Faith?, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., May 24, 2002, at A12; Colloquy Live,
supra note 3.
363. See Laycock, supra note 304, at 31. Cf JANOSIK, supra note 361, at 2 (noting, as part of
negative feedback to Villanova University's draft resource guide for Mission Centered Hiring, that
"[u]ntenured faculty felt that the values emphasized in the draft appeared to be in conflict with those
expressed in the rank and tenure policies to which they were currently responding").
364. See supra Parts 11and 1II.
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higher education. While this may be a valid goal, such institutions must
still consider the important institutional concerns that are implicated by
utilizing religious litmus tests for employees. Combating the increasing
pressure to secularize may lead an institution to consider using - or to
conclude it must use - a religious preference to maintain a sympathetic
faculty core. In doing so, an institution must be vigilant to tread lightly,
lest it invite the ire of the academic establishment. Not only would unfettered use of discriminatory tactics put it at risk of losing accreditation, it
would risk the appearance of rejecting the defining norm of the modem
university; namely, academic freedom. 365
Therefore, religious institutions of higher education must carefully
consider when and for what positions they exercise their right to discriminate on the basis of religion.3 66 A religious preference should only
be used when the institution deems it necessary to preserve its mission.
Furthermore, any such preference should be announced and explained.
No faculty member or administrator should feel blindsided by an employment decision based on a religious preference. In many instances, a
preference may not be necessary. Notre Dame, for example, always hires
the most academically qualified individual for the position, but takes
steps to encourage Catholics to apply. Therefore, the pool of applicants
is usually Catholic-heavy, and there is correspondingly a better chance
that the most qualified individual will be Catholic.36 7
Protecting the religious distinctiveness of these institutions is a
valid and laudable goal. On the other hand, eliminating discrimination is
an equally justifiable goal. Therefore, as participants in the public marketplace of ideas, religious institutions of higher education must be ever
cognizant of the message they send, especially in their role as educators
and molders of minds. Institutions that want to remain relevant and respected in the academic community cannot be seen as overtly hostile to
civil rights and equitable treatment. And they cannot be in the business
of teaching those sentiments to their students. If a religious college or
university does take that approach by utilizing its right to discriminate in
365. See Carter, supra note 5, at 494 ("[A] true university must not make the error of creating
such orthodoxy that nobody ever is allowed to question anything the religion teaches.").
366. Aside from a generalized concern for religious freedom, no institution should care to be
exempted from the prohibition on race, sex, or national origin discrimination unless such a result is
inherent to a specific religious tenet of the institution's affiliated faith. Even then, it could be that the
policy against such discrimination, especially on account of race, is enough to outweigh any religious liberty interest. Moreover, discrimination on those grounds by religious institutions of higher
education would not lead to the preservation of the kind of institutional variety in higher education
that this article argues must be encouraged.
367. Laycock, supra note 298, at 298.
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situations that are not required for the preservation of its religious mission and to maintain that critical mass of sympathetic faculty and administrators, then that institution may justifiably find itself marginalized in
the academic community.
Society, and more specifically academia, should respect the right of
its religious members to set up institutions of higher education and to
preserve the religious mission of the institutions through discrimination
if necessary. Nevertheless, religious institutions of higher education
should not unnecessarily invoke that privilege.
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